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Direct Discourse, Indirect Discourse and Belief

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1 Introduction

Consider

(1) Pierre sincerely says, "London is ugly"

(2) Pierre sincerely says that London is ugly,

(3) Pierre believes that London is ugly.

Kripke's Disquotation Principle licenses the inference from (1) to (3). It is natural to see the inference as having (2) as an intermediate step.

The inference from (1) to (2) goes from direct to indirect discourse. In direct discourse, a statement is classified in terms of the words actually used. In indirect discourse, it is classified in terms of its *content,* its truth-conditions. When we go from (1) to (2), we go from classifying Pierre's statement by the words he used, to classifying it by the proposition those words expressed – from the sentence 'London is ugly' to the proposition that London is ugly. This seems reasonable. This is the step I'll call 'disquotation'. When I have Kripke's principle in mind instead, I'll make that clear.

Indirect discourse classified statements – acts of saying something assertively – by their truth conditions. In that they are classifiable in this way, statements have something in common with beliefs and other cognitive states. More generally, instances of saying, requesting, and many linguistic activities, and instances of belief, desire and many other cognitive states, have truth and satisfaction conditions, which we use to identify and classify them. English we use 'that'-clauses, infinitives and other constructions for this purpose:

What is Said and What is Not
Carlo Penco & Filippo Domaneschi (eds.).

(2) Pierre sincerely says that London is ugly,

(3) Pierre believes that London is ugly.

(4) Alphonse asks Elwood to repair his fence.

(5) Alphonse wants Elwood to repair his fence.

In (2) the phrase 'that London is ugly' tells us what the world must be like for Pierre's statement to be true. In (3), it tells us what the world must be like for Pierre's belief to be true. So the step from (2) to (3) goes from using a certain proposition, that London is ugly, to classify a sincere linguistic act, to the existence of a belief, classifiable with exactly the same proposition.

In fact, we take certain kinds of linguistic acts to be motivated in part, when sincere, by certain sorts of cognitive states with corresponding contents. We think that requests, like (4), when sincere, are motivated in parts by desires, of the sort reported by (5). And we think that statements, when sincere, are motivated in part by beliefs. So the step from (2) to (3) is plausible; a statement with a certain content, taken to be sincere, means that there is a belief, with the same content, that serves as part of the motivation for making it. A sincere person says that the world is a certain way, because they believe that it is that way. This sort of step I'll call 'content explanation' – the occurrence of a sincere linguistic act with a certain content is explained by an appropriate cognitive state with the same content.

So Disquotation and Content Explanation yield Kripke's Disquotation Principle. It would be nice if it were a valid principle, for we often rely on it. Nevertheless things are not so simple. In this paper I examine the step from direct to indirect discourse, and the step from indirect discourse to attributions of belief. My aim is to explain not only why the quotation principle and the content explanation principles are not quite right, but also why they often do nevertheless lead to the right results.

2 Direct and Indirect Discourse

The important difference between direct and indirect discourse, for my purposes, is that in the latter the reporter characterizes the linguistic activity in terms of its content, and identifies that content from his or her own perspective --- the reporter's context and intentions determine the reference of the terms used. Another difference between direct and indirect discourse reports is that indirect discourse permits paraphrase. This difference I will pretty much ignore, limiting my attention to what we might call *literal* indirect quotation.

On the basis of a simple example, like (1) and (2), it might seem that both *Disquotation*[1] and *Quotation* were plausible:

Disquotation: From "A said 'S'" one may infer "A said that S"

Quotation: From "A said that S" one can infer "A said 'S'".

Quotation doesn't work, because there is more than one way to express a given proposition. Pierre might have said that London was ugly by saying "Londres est laid" instead of "London is ugly".

The principle of Disquotation is a bit more plausible; it works if we ignore the possibility that a term refers differently when used by the reporter than it does when used by the speaker. But as soon as we take divergences between the believer's and the reporter's perspectives into account, we see this principle does not work either. Suppose for example that Elwood, standing Santa Cruz, says, "This city is east of Berkeley". Harold, in Berkeley, would be correct if he reported:

(9) Elwood said "This city is east of Berkeley"

But he won't get things right if he says:

(10) Elwood said that this city is east of Berkeley

In (10), the words 'this city' refer to Berkeley, because that is where Harold is. (10) would imply that Elwood said the Berkeley was east of itself. So the principle of disquotation isn't right, either.

Such "reference shifting" gives us another reason to abandon the principle of quotation. Harold can report what Elwood said with (11):

(11) Elwood said that Santa Cruz is east of this city

But from this we cannot infer:

(12) Elwood said, "Santa Cruz is east of this city"

The relevance of the principle of reporter's perspective is not limited to statements involving indexicals and demonstratives. Suppose that Elwood, referring to Oxford, Nebraska, says, "Oxford has no colleges". Harold can truthfully say, perhaps defending Elwood against someone who thinks he must be quite ignorant:

(13) Elwood did say, "Oxford has no colleges." But he did not say that Oxford has no colleges. He knows that Oxford has lots of

[1] In "A Problem About Belief", Saul Kripke uses the phrase 'disquotation principle' for the related principle, that if A sincerely says, "S" we can infer that A believes that S.

colleges. He was talking about a town in Nebraska with the same name as Oxford.

In (11), Harold refers to Oxford, England with 'Oxford', and says something true about what Harold didn't say and does know about it.

Here is a simple account that seems to handle the cases considered so far.

(SA)

(i) The truth-conditions of a statement that uses a sentence of the form $\phi(t_1,\ldots,t_n)$, where ϕ is an n-place predicate and $t_1,\ldots,t_n$ are names or other referring expressions, are met if the objects to which $t_1,\ldots,t_n$ refer meet the condition designated by ϕ.[2]

(ii) The content of such a statement is the proposition that these objects meet that condition.

(iii) A report of the form "A says that S" is true, iff A makes a statement the content of which is the proposition that S;

Consider (9) and Harold's correct report (11) again. Elwood was standing in Santa Cruz, so his utterance of 'This city is east of Berkeley' expressed the proposition that Santa Cruz is east of Berkeley. Harold, in (11), uttered in Berkeley, designates that proposition with 'that Santa Cruz is east of this city'. So (SA) account for the correctness of Harold's report (11).

Now consider Harold's report (13). Harold is using 'Oxford' to refer to Oxford, England. So with "Oxford has no colleges" he expresses the false proposition that Oxford, England has no colleges. Since Elwood was using 'Oxford' to refer to Oxford, Nebraska, he did not express that proposition. So far so good. However, (SA) won't quite do.

3 San Sebastian and Donostia

A little background knowledge is required for the next example. 'San Sebastian' is the Spanish name for the Basque city of Donostia; that is:

(14) Donostia and San Sebastian are the same city.

[2] The natural language sentences in the examples are not of this form, of course. I assume that these simple sentences have a natural translation into a 'logical form' which the reader can supply. This is admittedly a pretty cheeky assumption, but it would be quite a detour from the main points I want to make to say things more accurately

Now consider the brilliant linguist Ivan.[3] When he first went to a conference in San Sebastian, he took a bus in from the Hondarribia airport to the city, in the company of other linguists and philosophers, all of whom had been to conferences in the Basque Country before. On the trip, Ivan was struck by the fact that, according to the signs along the road, San Sebastian and Donostia, a city he thought he'd never heard of, were the same distance from the airport, first ten kilometers, then seven kilometers, then three kilometers, and so on. Suppose that during the trip Herb mused out loud:

(15) Ivan said, "This bus is going to San Sebastian",

and

(16) Ivan said, "This bus is not going to Donostia"

The following are intuitively true reports about what Ivan said, made by Herb, a colleague on the same bus who overheard him, reporting back to the other veteran conference goers, who are curious as to whether Ivan has yet learned that 'Donostia' is another name for San Sebastian.

(17) Ivan said that this bus was going to San Sebastian.

(18) Ivan did not say that this bus was going to Donostia.

This presents at least an apparent problem for (SA). By (i), we have, where **b** is the bus Ivan and the reporter were both on:

(19) The proposition that **b** was going to San Sebastian = the proposition that **b** was going to Donostia.

I'll call this proposition **P.**

But then it seems that if (17) is true, so is

(20) Ivan said that this bus was going to Donostia.

But (18), which seemed intuitively true, denies this.

One response to the problem is to suppose that the Simple Account is correct, in spite of our intuitions. In fact (18) is false and (20) is true, just as (SA) predicts. Our misleading intuitions to the contrary have a pragmatic explanation. Although Ivan did say that the bus was going to Donostia, (20)

[3] I have in mind the brilliant linguist Ivan Sag. I'm not sure he has been to San Sebastian, and, if so, whether he was confused in the way I describe – I certainly was on my first trip there. Sag's linguistic theory, "HPSG," seems to me quite wonderful, and especially apt for philosophical purposes. I would have liked to pay tribute to Ivan and his theory with a paper that showed this, but it is beyond my competence to do so. So I pay tribute to him by putting him in my example.

is a very misleading way to report this. In this situation, how Ivan referred to the city was clearly of interest to the veterans. They will be very prone to employ the quotation principle, and infer from "Ivan said that this bus is going to Donostia" to "Ivan said, "This bus is going to Donostia". This inference might lead them to expect that Ivan is aware of (9), and would not be confused by references to San Sebastian as "Donostia". So it would be true, but inappropriate, for Herb to say, "Ivan said this bus is going to Donostia". I'll call this the "Bite the Bullet" strategy.

But then why should the Herb say something false, like (18)? What is the 'pragmatic explanation' that accounts for our misleading intuitions? Perhaps in saying (18) the reporter not trying to say something true, but trying to say something *clearly* false, given (17) and (9), as way of suggesting, or implicating, to use Grice's term, something true, namely, that Ivan is unaware of (9). Our intuition that (20) is true is simply confused. (20) is appropriate, as a way of conveying a true implicature, but strictly speaking it is, as the Simple Account implies, false.

Although Jon Barwise and I put forward a view like this in *Situations and Attitudes*, I don't think it is very plausible. When one considers a wide range of cases, it is not at all easy to come up with such Gricean explanations of what is going on. Even in this case, the explanation suggested is not very plausible. For one thing, since most people would regard (18) as true, it seems we have to suppose that the crucial pragmatic planning and reasoning is not only unconscious, but doesn't even correspond to what the speaker and his audience believe. Even setting that aside, there is the fact that (18) seems like a very natural thing to say in the circumstance, rather than a somewhat subtle case of suggesting something true by saying something clearly false. After all, it would be simple enough for the speaker to simply point out that Ivan didn't use the word 'Donostia', and one shouldn't assume that he knows (9). If (18) is in fact false, this would seem much more natural communicative strategy that uttering it. But it doesn't seem more natural.

So I think we need not simply to supplement the Simple Account, but to amend it in substantial ways.

4 A Role Based Account

Consider again

(15) "This bus is going to San Sebastian",

(17) Ivan said that this bus was going to San Sebastian.

(20) Ivan said that this bus was going to Donostia.

A role provides a partial function from an agent at a time to an object. That is the role he *exploits* in using "this bus". When Ivan uses the term 'this bus' in (15), he refers to the bus that plays a certain role in his life at that time, the bus he is *on* then. This is but one of many roles one can use the term 'this bus' to exploit. In other situations, one might be referring to a bus one is pointing to in a brochure, or a bus that someone has brought up in conversation, or buses that play various other roles in one's life. The meaning of 'this bus', if 'bus' is used literally, constraints which role one is exploiting, but does not fully settle the issue. Paradigmatically, it will be a bus Ivan perceives and is attending to, as with (15). However, it may be a bus that is otherwise salient, as in the other examples.

Somewhat similarly, one can use the name 'San Sebastian' to refer to a number of cities (and other things). In (15) it is the San Sebastian in the Basque Country in Spain; there are also San Sebastians in Chile, Costa Rica, the Philippines and many other places. There is also a third century martyr and a famous nightclub in Brazil with that name, and a rock group as well. In (15), Ivan uses it with the intention of referring to the Basque city, exploiting a role it plays in his life. There is a network of references to that city, many involving the name 'San Sebastian', and thereby supporting a convention that allows us to use that name to refer to that city. The city is the origin of the network. The uses of the name by Ivan's colleagues on the trip, in the brochures and emails involved in planning the trip, the name's appearance on the front of the bus, and on the mileage signs along the way, all exploit this network, and Ivan is in a position to exploit it by using 'San Sebastian' with no further explanation of which San Sebastian he intends to refer to.

The way that Ivan manages to refer to the bus and the city, and so express proposition **P***,* is partly identified by these roles. When we classify (15) by its content, the proposition **P***,* however, we lose track of these roles. If we think that (17) is true, but (20) is not, it is because we think that the difference in the reports implies something about Ivan's utterance that goes beyond the content, and conveys information about the way he expressed it.

The suggestion I make, patterned after the Crimmins-Perry account of belief reports[4], is that the roles Ivan associated with his utterances of 'this bus' and 'San Sebastian' are *unarticulated constituent* of (17). It will be simplest to develop this suggestion in two steps.

First, I introduce the technical concept, term, 'saying-via':

A says that $\chi(\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_n)$ *via* $\mathbf{r_1, \ldots, r_n}$

[4] Footnote to Crimmins Perry.

This means that A made a statement with the content that objects $\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_n$ meet condition χ , and that the utterances in that statement that referred to object $\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_n$ exploited roles $\mathbf{r_1, \ldots, r_n}$. So,

(21) Ivan said that this bus was going to San Sebastian *via* the roles of being the bus he was on, and the role of being the origin of the 'San Sebastian' network exploited in the brochures, etc.

is true. However,

(22) Ivan said that this bus was going to San Sebastian *via* the roles of being the bus he was on, and the role of being the origin of the 'Donostia' network exploited by the road signs he saw using that name, etc.

is false. On the other hand,

(23) Ivan *didn't* say that this bus was going to San Sebastian *via* the roles of being the bus he was on, and the role of being the origin of the 'Donostia' network exploited by the road signs he saw using that name, etc.

is true.

Then, as the second step in the account, we suppose that ordinary saying reports have, as unarticulated constituents, what saying-via reports represent explicitly. Thus a particular report,

A says that $\chi(\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_n)$,

has a sequence of roles, $\mathbf{r_1, \ldots, r_n}$, as unarticulated constituents. It is true iff A made a statement with the content that objects $\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_n$ meet condition χ , and that the utterances in that statement that referred to object $\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_n$ exploited roles $\mathbf{r_1, \ldots, r_n}$.[5]

5 The Pragmatics of Narrative Reports

It is clear that this account, like the Bite the Bullet account, will require a good bit of pragmatics to explain our intuitive judgments about statements like (15) - (20), because of the reliance on unarticulated constituents. Here, however, I think more satisfying explanations can be found.

Consider (18) and (20). In the imagined scenario, (18) seemed true, and (20) seemed false. But consider an alternative scenario. Herb is reporting

[5] This account oversimplifies, assuming that we can keep track of the objects that play the roles exploited in the statement by their order. In Crimmins and Perry (1989) we introduce a more complicated way of doing things that avoids this assumption; here I ignore the complication, in the spirit of footnote 2.

what Ivan said to a group of native Basques that don't know Ivan, and don't care whether he has learned that 'Donostia' and 'San Sebastian' are names for the same city. They all refer to Donostia as 'Donostia'; perhaps some are unaware that it is called 'San Sebastian', while others avoid using the term 'San Sebastian' because of its Spanish origin. These people aren't going to the conference. For some reason, they became unsure that they had gotten on the right bus, the bus to Donostia, and asked Herb went to ask Ivan, a person who had the definite air of knowing what he was doing. In that case, it seems that Herb could say (20) to express something true, and (18) to express something false, and, in fact, quite alarming.

In the first scenario, we supposed that the unarticulated role via which Ivan refers to Donostia was suggested, in Herb's report, by his choice of the term 'San Sebastian' to refer to Donostia. So, in (17), he is telling us that Ivan said what he did exploiting the role associated with the name 'San Sebastia', and in (18), telling us what Ivan didn't say using the role associated with the name 'Donostia'. In the second scenario, we are not assuming that. Here Herb is interested in using a term for Donostia that his audience will all understand and not find annoying. He does not mean to suggest anything about how Ivan referred to the city.

In this case, Herb's audience doesn't much care which name Ivan uses to refer to Donostia. They want to know what he thinks about the issue of whether the bus is headed to that city, whatever he calls it. They are interested in what Ivan believes about the issue as evidence for the truth about the issue, rather than as a guide to interactions with Ivan. They are not interested in knowing how to couch questions to Ivan themselves, or how to predict how he will articulate his beliefs about Donostia. Ivan can get off at the next stop and disappear, for all they care. So, with a slight qualification, they don't care how he referred to Donostia in the episode Herb reports.

The qualification is this. However much expertise a person has about a given object, there is likely some ways of referring to the object that she is unaware of. What she says or doesn't say about the object using that mode of reference won't exhibit his expertise. For example, as the bus goes along the top of a ridge, San Sebastian may be visible in the distance. Ivan can see it, but has no idea that whether it is or is not San Sebastian. If Herb points to the city and asks, "Is this bus going to that city?" Ivan will say, "I don't know". Our travelers want to know what Ivan thinks about where the bus is headed, given that he is thinking about Donostia in the way that is related to his expertise about where the bus is headed, that is, via the name 'San Sebastian', which he would have seen on the front of the bus. While they don't take Herb's choice of names for the city, in reporting what Ivan said, as an attempt to convey the names Ivan was using, they do assume that

Herb is reporting what Ivan had to say relative to a way of identifying San Sebastian that fit with Ivan's presumed expertise.

When I set up the earlier scenario, however, I drew attention to the two names, and suggested some interest on the part of the veterans as to whether Ivan had learned of their co-reference. Perhaps this was the main motive for Herb querying Ivan. This made it natural to take Herb's choice of names as an attempt to suggest both the names Ivan had used, and the related roles he exploited.

The Disquotation Principle, then, is not generally valid. It should be used only when the reporter intends to suggest the roles the speaker exploited in his or her utterance, by using he very same roles in the report. This is a common strategy with names, but because it is the reporter's perspective that determines the reference of demonstratives and indexicals, it is less common with them.

There is a phenomenon, noted by Hector-Neri Castañeda, that has to do with the way we use indexicals and demonstratives in reports, however. If Herb were to say, "Ivan asked why I wanted to know, "it would be natural to suppose that Ivan said, "Why do you want to know?" It would be surpising if Ivan had said, "Why does Herb want to know?" If Herb reports, "Ivan said he is busy now, I should ask him later," it would be natural to suppose that Ivan said, "I'm busy now, you should ask me later". If for some reason Herb is delayed getting back to the group, and reports, "Ivan said he was busy then, I should ask him later", this would still suggest that Ivan referred to the time of Herb's inquiry as "now". Even with indexical and demonstratives, the reporter can suggest how the speaker referred to things, for there are natural ways to use indexicals and demonstratives to refer to things in familiar situations.

6 Sincere Saying and Believing

In Crimmins and Perry (1989), Mark Crimmins and I assumed that beliefs and other cognitive state have a structure that involved *notions* of objects. People have beliefs about objects *via* notions. These notions enter into the semantics of ordinary belief reports as unarticulated constituents. But we can introduce a technical language, as we did with 'says'.

A believes that $\chi(\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_n)$ *via* $\mathbf{r_1, \ldots, r_n}$.

As we are imagining Ivan, he has two notions of Donostia, providing him with two 'cognitive fixes' on the city, to use Howard Wettstein's useful term. One is associated with the name 'San Sebastian' and a number of other properties: being where the conference is to be held, being the city the bus is headed to, being the home of the University of the Basque Country,

an so on. The other, which he acquired while on the bus, when he saw the mileage sign, is much more sparse. It is associated with the name 'Donostia', and being near San Sebastian. Call these $\mathbf{n}_{SS}$ and $\mathbf{n}_{D}$. Call the notion he has of the bus $\mathbf{n}_{B}$. Thus

(24) Ivan believes that **b** is going to Donostia via $\mathbf{n}_{B}$ and $\mathbf{n}_{SS}$.

(25) Ivan does not believe that **b** is going to Donostia via $\mathbf{n}_{B}$ and $\mathbf{n}_{D}$.

Ivan's notions $\mathbf{n}_{B}$ and $\mathbf{n}_{D}$ are parts of what I call a 'name-notion network', the origin of which is Donostia. At some point, conventions were introduced that permit one to refer to that city using these names. Uses of these names, along with indefinitely many other instances of referring to Donostia in other ways --- as 'this city', 'that city', and so on – are linked into a network of references that are intended to co-refer with earlier references. And the references are connected with notions in minds, that are used to store information (and misinformation) that one picks up by hearing statements using the names, and other references one takes to be part of the same network, and that guide one's own statements using the names. A rather elaborate theory of all of this in *Reference and Reflexivity* and *Critical Pragmatics*, but I hope the idea is intuitive enough for the purposes of this essay without going further into the details.

Now consider an inference like

(26) Ivan sincerely says that this bus is going to Donostia via $\mathbf{r}_{B}$ and $\mathbf{r}_{SS}$.

to

(27) Ivan believes that this bus is going to Donostia via $\mathbf{n}_{B}$ and $\mathbf{n}_{SS}$.

The inference is correct only on the assumption that there is a certain connection between $\mathbf{r}_{B}$ and $\mathbf{n}_{B}$ and $\mathbf{r}_{SS}$ and $\mathbf{n}_{SS}$.

The connection is that the properties and relations one associates with notions, constrain the roles one uses to refer to those things, or try to refer to them. Acts of reference are motivated by complexes of desires (or pro-attitudes more generally) and beliefs (or doxastic states more generally). Ivan's attempt to refer to a certain city with 'San Sebastian' is motivated by the belief that the city to which he wishes to refer has that name. His attempt to refer to **b** with 'this bus' is motivated by the belief that the bus he wishes to refer to is the one which he is on. Moreover, if his statement is sincere, the notion that supports referring to the object in the chosen way, will also be associated with the properties that he asserts the object to have in the statement. The grounds for going from (26) to (27) are that, as I have

told the story, Ivan's notions $\mathbf{n}_B$ and $\mathbf{n}_{SS}$ are the only ones he has that could motivate his sincerely saying what he does, exploiting the roles he exploits.

Ivan's case, and Pierre's, are interesting because they have two notions of the object they say something about, and are reported as saying something about. This in itself is not unusual. It often takes us a while to recognize things, and during the interval we have two notions of the same thing. Suppose I see my old friend David Roberts at a high school reunion. He has changed significantly since I last saw him, more than fifty years ago. We are talking; he recognizes me, an I struggle to figure out who I am talking to, without having to resort to asking. I have a notion, one that I've had most of my life associated with the name 'David Roberts' and tons of memories. This is what I call a 'detached notion'. It isn't attached to any perception or any action. The other notion, the one I acquired when I saw this fellow, is attached to my current perceptions. I am madly filling it with information from what I see and what he says, hoping to make an identification. It is a 'buffer', a notion attached to ongoing perceptions and governing actions towards the object perceived. Eventually, I figure out that it is David I am talking to; I add that content of the buffer to the old notion, which now becomes attached.[6]

Perhaps, a bit later, in a burst of candor I say to David, "I didn't recognize you at first. I didn't know you were here. I thought you were in Minnesota". David wouldn't having any trouble making sense of this, roughly: "John didn't recognize me, though of via his perceptual buffer, as the person he knows as "David Roberts" and presumably has a rich and detailed, if dated, notion of. He thought, via that notion, that I was in Minnesota." It would be rather impish for him to say, "How could you not know I was here when you were talking to me?".

In cases where lack of recognition or misrecognition are likely, in particular where current perception needs to be lined up with stored memoires, we are alive to these possibilities, and don't get confused. Cases of famous people, like Cicero and Tully, or Bill Clinton and Bill Brewster, or famous cities, like London and Londres, or Donostia and San Sebastian, that have two names, which an otherwise competent speaker might not know are co-referential, are much less usual, although hardly rare. We have plenty of resources for dealing with such cases when they arise.

7 Pierre

Let's look at Pierre. We suppose that, in a conversation in London,

[6] Compare Crimmins on common notions.

(1) Pierre sincerely says, "London is ugly"

It seems that a participant in the conversation could infer

(2) Pierre says that London is ugly.

The reporter's perspective seems to be the same, as far as the reference of an utterance of 'London' goes, we can apply disquotation. From (2) and the assumption that Pierre speaks sincerely, it seems that we can infer

(5) Pierre believes that London is ugly.

This all seems pretty straightforward, but the considerations raised in the previous sections suggest that a lot is going on under the surface.

The other side of Kripke's problem about belief is that, perhaps in the same conversation,

(28) Pierre says, "Londres is not ugly".

If from this we can infer

(29) Pierre believes that London is not ugly

we will have convicted Pierre of an internal contradiction of a sort that it seems that a thoughtful and logical person should not be capable of. If we can infer

(30) Pierre doesn't believe that London is ugly

we will have contradicted ourselves.

Pierre, like Ivan, has two notions of the same city without knowing it. Of course, Ivan is easily excused, as he hasn't had very much evidence to the effect that San Sebastian is Donostia. In contrast, it seems that Pierre must be somewhat inattentive not to have figured out that London is Londres.

Still, if we think of our beliefs about things as organized around notions, we will have to distinguish two ways in which (1) and (29) might turn out to be true. If the belief of Pierre's that makes (1) true, and the belief of his that make (29) true, share a common notion of London, then logically speaking he is quite criticizable. But that's not what the story suggests. He has two notions, which I'll dub $\mathbf{n}_{\mathbf{London}}$ and $\mathbf{n}_{\text{Londres}}$. The first is associated with such properties as being the place he has been living, having a name spelled "London," in English, and being ugly. The second is associated with such properties as being a place he read about as a child, having a name spelled "Londres" in French, and being quite beautiful and so not ugly. A good logician could end up in this situation. Given the somewhat otherworldly

mindset of many logicians in my experience, one might even think it more likely for logicians than for others.

In the situation, even if we were unaware of the background story Kripke provides, it would be natural to suppose that Pierre is unaware that London is Londres. What he thinks about "London" and "Londres" might be more difficult to discern. He might think there are two names, rather than two spellings and pronunciations of the same name. But he might be quite aware that "Londres" is the French version of "London". He might be aware that there are a number of Londons around the world --- the London in England, the one in Ontario, London, California, to mention just three of many --- and realize that the city he read about as a child would be called "London" in English. But he might suppose that this *must* be a different London than the one he read about, and be using "Londres" to suggest that he is exploiting the name-notion network that the occurrences of "Londres" he found in his childhood reading were a part of, and not the one that he now exploits when he says "London".

Thoughtful undergraduates, without much exposure to the philosophy of language, are irritatingly un-mystified by the Pierre case. They say something like, "Well, he believes that London is ugly, but believes that Londres isn't ugly. He has two ideas of the same city". This is, I think, just the right thing to say. Which isn't to say they won't benefit by talking a philosophy of language course.