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Persons and Selves

John Perry

Professor of Philosophy (Emeritus) Stanford
Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside.

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0. Abstract

The simple theory of selves maintains that selves are simply persons; `self' is a role word, the role is *being identical with*, and one's self is simply the person that plays that role in one's life, that is, oneself. But we often use the term `self' in a way that implies that there can be more than one self per person, or various selves that compete for control of one person, throughout a range of fairly normal cases to the kind of extreme cases once known as `multiple personality'. I argue that this use of `self' can be seen as a metaphorical extension of the word to motivating complexes, the nature of which I try to explain.

La théorie simple des soi ("selves") consiste à dire que les soi sont tout simplement des personnes; 'soi' est un mot qui définit un rôle, le rôle dans le cas présent est celui d' *être identique à*, et le soi de chacun est tout simplement la personne qui joue ce rôle dans la vie de chacun, c'est-à-dire, soi-même. Mais nous faisons souvent usage du terme 'soi' d'une manière qui implique qu'il peut y avoir plus d'un soi par personne, c'est-à-dire différents soi qui sont en compétition pour le contrôle d'une seule personne, allant de cas assez courants jusqu'au genre de cas extrême que l'on a un temps décrits commes des cas de 'personnalité multiple'. Je soutiens que cet usage du mot 'soi' peut être considéré comme une extension métaphorique du mot à des complexes de motivation dont je tente d'expliquer la nature.

1. Persons and Selves

The relation between being a person and being a live human being may be rather subtle. It may be that there are members of other species, terrestrial or alien, who satisfy the conditions of personhood, so that being a human being is not a necessary condition for being a person. It may be that human infants and some humans with diseased or injured brains are not persons, so being a human being is not sufficient for being a person. And it may be that if brains were transplanted,

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we might have cases in which we have the same person, but not the same human being.

Nevertheless, in the paradigm cases, it seems like persons are just human beings, or the subset of human beings that fulfill the conditions of personhood. I think that I am a person, and the person I am is a certain live human being, a flesh and blood creature, and has been and will remain the same human being throughout its career. I suspect this is all true of you, too. At any rate, I shall assume so in this paper, for the connection between persons and human beings is not what I want to focus on.

I want to explore is the relation between selves and persons, on the assumption that persons are basically human beings. The simplest theory, and the one to which I am drawn, is that selves are simply persons, and so also basically human beings.[1] `Self' is a role word; it stands for a person, in virtue of his or her relation to a person in question. `Neighbor' is a role word; it stands for those who live next to the person in question. `Mother' is a role word; it stands for the female parent of the person in question. `Home' is a role word; it stands for the place the person in question lives. And `self' is a role word; it stands for the person identical with the person in question. The most natural place for the morpheme `self' is as the second part of the reflexive pronouns `himself' and `herself', where it adds the condition of identity with the person in question, typically the person referred to by the subject of the main clause. Thus in ``Elwood believes himself to be a hero," the person Elwood is said to think to be a hero is Elwood; that is, the one and only person related by identity to Elwood; that is, Elwood himself.

Role words arise when the relations from which they derive from are important, and connect with special ways for the person in question to know of or act upon those who are so related, or certain characteristics emotions that are often felt regarding them. Identity is such a case. There are quite characteristic ways one has of knowing a wide range of things about oneself; as Frege said,

[1] See Perry, *Identity, Personal Identity and the Self*, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002.

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there is a certain way we are each presented to ourselves. I can know if I am hungry, if my feet are sore, if I am angry and the like in certain ways; you know the same things about yourself in the same ways. And there are ways of acting upon ourselves that are special; I can clear my throat, or bring it about that I am sitting down, or talking, or shouting, or making a nasty face in ways that won't work for me to bring it about that you do those things. And we expect people to experience certain emotions, in the face of information about themselves, which they would not experience, given the same information about others. As badly as I feel for you when I learn you are to have a root canal tomorrow, the fear and trepidation I feel when I learn that I am to have one is quite different.

In philosophy the self is traditionally thought of as an experiencing, active being; a subject of experiences and actions. The self is also usually thought to be importantly connected with the first-person; the word `I' expresses self-knowledge; as Miss Anscombe points out, Descartes couldn't have made the point he wanted to make by saying ``Descartes thinks.''[2] The person seems a promising candidate for playing these roles. It seems plausible to say that I think, I experience, I act, and I am the person, John Perry.

2. MULTIPLE SELVES?

Nevertheless, many other hypotheses for what the selves might be have been put forward: the self is an ultimate subject, a subject that cannot be an object; the self is transcendent; selves are momentary blips of consciousness; the self is the soul called for in Christian Theology; the self is a fiction; and so on. Here I am concerned with showing how the simple theory can deal with one problem, which might seem to pose a problem for it and an advantage for some of the others. This is the fact that there are cases in which there seems to be more than one agent, and perhaps more than one subject of experience (or more than one

[2] Anscombe, G.E.M. "The First Person." In *Mind and Language*, edited by Samuel Guttenplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.

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stream of experiences), connected with a single person. In such cases two selves seem to complete for control of one person at the same time.

Cases of temptation and moral turmoil can be seen in this way; one's "lower self" and "higher self" are locked in combat. One can hardly object to such talk as a metaphor, or even as a derivative and loose meaning for the expression `self'. But do we need to recognize it as more than that, to recognize something other than the flesh and blood person as the agent and subject?

The traditional literature of "multiple personality" provides more radical cases of this sort. [3] Scientists and doctors aren't in agreement about what to say about them, but as philosophers we can consider them as at least apparently coherent descriptions of disordered lives, and hence legitimate thought experiments, until the scientific dust settles.

Three Faces of Eve[4], written by two therapists, tells the story of a woman they call `Eve'; they call her personalities `Eve White', `Eve Black' and `Jane'. Responsible timid Eve White had memory lapses; during these periods an immature and impetuous alter ego the therapists called `Eve Black' seemed to take control of things. Later a third character emerged, Jane, emerges; Jane is less timid than Eve White and less immature than Eve Black. All three personalities

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[3] By the traditional literature, I have mainly in mind cases described by Morton Prince in *The dissociation of a personality*. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co, 1906, 1908, by William James in *The Principles of Psychology*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981 (Originally published in 1890), and in *The Three Faces of Eve* (citation below). These are traditional at least in the sense that they are the ones I had read about forty years ago when I began thinking about this. The last fifty years have seen an explosion of cases that don't fit the relatively simple patterns they exemplify, a new name for the syndrome, ``Dissasociative Personality Disorder", and widespread suspicions that some of the most philosophical striking aspects of the disorder may induced by therapy. See Ian Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, for a good account of where things stood by the late 1990's, and penetrating analysis of the way ideas and practices of treatment, diagnosis, classification, nomenclature and theory have fed into one another. My aims are simply to think through the things that puzzled me about the case of Eve, as originally described, assuming it is at least a coherent possibility.

[4] Thigpen, Corbett H. and Hervey M. Cleckley. *The Three Faces of Eve*. First published in 1957. Revised edition, Kingsport Tenn.: Arcata Graphics 1992. The book was made into a movie starring Joanne Woodward as Eve. The patient known as Eve later published her own accounts which differed from those of Thigpen and Cleckley, her original therapists. See, Costner, Chris, *A Mind of My Own: The Woman Who Was Known As "Eve" Tells the Story of Her Triumph over Multiple Personality Disorder*, William Morrow & Co, 1989 and Chris Costner with Elen Pittillo, *I'm Eve. The Compelling Story of the International Case Of Multiple Personality*. Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1977

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are integrated into Jane as the book ends. Later theorists were most skeptical about Jane, that is, whether Jane was a real alter-ego all along, or product of therapy. I'll focus on Eve White and Eve Black, partly because of this skepticism, but mostly because that gives me plenty to deal with.

These two personalities were not just combinations of moods and habits that varied with time, as the word `personality' might suggest. There seemed to be two agents, and two streams of consciousness, somehow involved with the same person; that is, two selves, but only one person. If there can be two selves where there is only one person, then the self, whatever it is, cannot simply be the person, and the simple view must be wrong.

It is rather difficult to imagine what it was like to be Eve, so I'll start with the simpler if less formidable case of temptation. All of us sometimes undergo experiences of temptations we try to resist, where it may seem somewhat natural to say that there is more than one agent, one self, involved. These are cases in which the competition between incompatible desires seems to be resolved not by deliberation by a single self, and can easily be thought of as competition among inner selves, motivated by the various desires, for control of one's "effectors" --- the muscles that control one's hands and limbs and torso, tongue and larynx, and face and eyes, and the structures that control one's internal voice and one's thoughts. I drive by an accident, and resolve to keep my eyes on the road, but, in response to my curiosity, my head and eyes turn towards the wreckage; briefly, but purposively, in order to see the accident, in spite of my resolve. A colleague's remarks at a department meeting angers me; my inner voice tells me to stay calm, and reminds me that nothing will be gained by expressing my feelings, but whatever agent guides the inner voice seems to have no control over the one that guides the outer voice, and I say stupid things anyway. The word `conscience' gets at one sort of case. We are doing one thing, taking one too many drinks, perhaps, but an inner voice is telling us to quit, perhaps reminding us of remembered past and possible future untoward consequences of drinking too much. But if there is an inner voice, someone must be doing the inner talking. If

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it's me that's doing the talking, and also me that's doing the drinking, that seems a bit odd. If I want to drink, I should shut up. If I want not to drink, I should put down the glass. Given that I have both desires, I should weigh them before acting on either. Instead, part of me, my conscience, or my superego, or my internalized grandmother, is shouting away, motivated by the one desire, while another part of me is drinking away, motivated by the other. Each of these aspects of me seems to be agent-like, acting in accordance with motives, but employing different effectors. My conscience has control of my inner voice, that is, my capacity to produce word-like thoughts of which I am conscious; my party-self has control of my hand and lips and tongue. My conscience can't make my party-self stop drinking; my party-self can't get my conscience to shut up.

3. Self-Notions

Since the self is the subject of experiences and mental states, it is usually taken to be what we refer to when we ascribe experiences, beliefs, desires, and actions to ourselves using the word `I'. I'll call the beliefs we report ourselves to have using the first-person `self-beliefs', and similar for `self-desires' and so forth.

A variety of real and imagined cases make it natural to draw a distinction between self-beliefs and beliefs that simply happen to be about the person who is doing the believing. Hector-Neri Castañeda imagined a war hero --- I'll call him `Harold', who, while performing heroic deeds, is injured and loses his dog-tags.[5] He wanders from the field of battle and ends up in a military hospital with amnesia --- we'll assume the sort of amnesia that is consistent with retaining personal identity.[6] Neither he nor the medical staff can figure out who he is; he takes a new name, `Donald', let's say, and after being discharged he goes on to get a Ph.D. in history, writing a biography of the war hero as his dissertation, without realizing that he is writing about himself. He believes many things about the war hero, that, in some sense, he thereby believes about himself, since he is

[5] Hector-Neri Castañeda, "'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness," *Ratio* 7 (1966): 130-157.
[6] See Perry, ``Williams on the Self and the Future," in *Identity, Personal Identity and the Self.*

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the war hero. But these are not self-beliefs. He would not say, ``I went around behind the hill, came up on the enemy battery from behind, and captured an entire company single-handed,'' although he says all of this of the war hero, and he is the war hero.

This is not a demonstration that the self is not the person, for in general it is quite possible to have two ideas about the same thing without realizing it. I maintain that we should regard such ideas as (more or less) concrete structures in the mind that are components of beliefs, desires, and other attitudes. I call ideas *of* particulars, like people, animals, cities, and so forth, *notions*. A cognition like a belief consists of a structure of ideas; my belief Palo Alto is boring has my notion of Palo Alto and my idea of being boring as components. The content of a belief is not a concrete structure, but an abstract one, a proposition, that encodes the truth-conditions of the belief, given what the idea in it are of. What I believe is a proposition with Palo Alto as a constituent. Given this framework, it is easy to think of cases where one has two ideas of one thing, that are components of different beliefs about that thing, although the person is ignorant of the identity. One may believe that Tully was an orator but not realize Cicero was; believe that Bill Clinton was President but think that Bill Blythe never left Arkansas; or believe that Harold is a dead war hero while Donald is a live graduate student.

It seems we all have a notion dedicated to information we pick up about ourselves in normally self-informative ways and use to guide normally self-effecting actions. I'll call these *self-notions*. When I am aware of a headache in the way one is aware of one's own headaches, the idea of having a headache becomes associated with my self-notion; I have a belief of the sort I would naturally express with the first person: ``I have a headache''. This belief, together with a desire not to have a headache, leads to a self-effecting action: putting an aspirin in *my* mouth, and drinking some water. The self-notion is a component of the belief; John Perry, the person, me, is a *constituent* of the proposition I believe.

If I were to contract amnesia, like Castañeda's war-hero, I might forget my name. I might find John Perry's drivers' license, and realize that he lives in Palo

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Alto, without believing that *I* live in Palo Alto. I am a constituent of the belief I thereby acquire, and express with ``John Perry lives in Palo Alto", but my self-notion is not a component of the acquired belief and so it is not a self-belief. I may also believe that I live in Palo Alto, in virtue of having a belief with my self-notion as a component. Then I would have two beliefs with the same *referential content*: that John Perry lives in Palo Alto.

The self-notion does not only contain information gathered in normally self-informative ways. As long as my memory is intact and I remember my name and other key fact about myself, I can find out further information about myself in the same way that others do, by reading about John Perry. If I want to know where my seminar meets, or what my office phone number is, or which committees I am on, I consult the directories and memos sent out by the department staff and look for my name, the same way you might if you wanted to know where my seminar meets, or what my office phone number is, or which committees I am on. But I, unlike you, I add this information to my self-notion, where it affects normally self-effect actions, like how I move in order to make it to the indicated seminar room.

The self-notion is also a component of desires. I might have found John Perry's driver's license while looking for my own. I have the desire that I find my driver's license. I also have a different desire, once I realize that John Perry seems to have lost his driver's license; that John Perry find his driver's license. One desire has my self-notion as a component, the other does not. They both have the same conditions of satisfaction: that a certain person, in fact me, find his driver's license.

What is the relation between self-notions and the self? The way I have described self-notions one might think of them as a passive data base, which the self consults, the way one might consult the file folders in one's filing cabinet. Then the self would seem to be a being that gets information from inspecting the self-notion (and other of its ideas) and uses the information thus gathered to guide action, in accord with the desires it find in the self-notion. But this seems

an unattractive way to go. What sort of thing would this self be? And why does it react differently to finding the information about beliefs and desires stored in the self-notion, than to finding beliefs and desires stored in other notions? The work that the self-notion does, in getting at the difference between self-belief and belief that happens to be about oneself, would have to be repeated for the inspecting self. And then that self might need another self, to inspect its ideas.

4. SELF-SYSTEMS

Thus we must think of the self-notion not as a passive but as an active database, or rather data-base embedded in an active system that initiates actions based on its own states, which I'll call a *self-system*. A traditional calendar is a passive database. It provides information to a perceiving agent, who takes action based on the information. A traditional alarm clock is an active system. Once I have set the clock, positions of the minute and hour gears carry information about what time it is, represented on the dial by the hands. Once I have set the alarm, the position of that gear carries information about when I want to be awakened. When the two gears align, the lever that keeps the alarm from ringing falls out of position and it rings. The calendar on my computer is a more impressive example. It initiates actions that are appropriate to the information it contains about my schedule and the preferences I have chosen. A day before a meeting it sends me email; does so again an hour before the meeting; and then ten minutes before the meeting makes a message pop up on my computer screen.

When I self-desire to eat a donut, and self-believe that eating a donut will have no terrible adverse effects, and see a donut before me on a plate, I will reach out and pick up the donut and bring it to my mouth. It suffices for me to *have* the beliefs and desires, in virtue of associations of ideas with my self-notion; I don't need, in addition, to inspect my self-notion and add a further layer of representation.

The word `representation' can mislead. The so-called representative theory of mind or of perception is often associated with a picture of an inner self

looking at a field of internal representations. If ideas and their combinations are, as Berkeley said repeatedly, completely passive, then there seems to be a need for such a self, a source of activity, to inspect them and initiate appropriate actions. But cognitions are not passive representations, like words on a page or pictures in a gallery, but what I will call `representational states'.

Representational states have contents and causal roles which *mesh;* that is, the effect of the belief makes sense given its content. My belief that there is a donut in front of me has an effect on the action I take; I move my hand towards the plate in front of me. If I believed that the donut was to the side, I would make a different motion; if I believed the thing on the plate was a hockey puck, I wouldn't reach at all. The effect is incremental; the acquisition of the belief will have one effect if I want to eat a donut, another if I want to crumble a donut, another if I want to avoid seeing a donut so I won't be tempted. The belief is basically a multi-purpose INUS condition[7] combining with other cognitions to produce different actions on my part, but always actions that make sense given the presence of a donut before me and the contents of the desires and other beliefs that combine into the sufficient condition. The incremental effect of the belief on my action makes sense, in that the action will succeed in satisfying the relevant desires --- i.e., those involved in the rest of the causally sufficient condition, given the other beliefs involved in the causally sufficient condition --- if the situation it represents, there being a donut in front of me, obtains.

Uttering the word `I' is a self-effecting action in a somewhat extended sense. Uttering the word `I' in English, or using first-person in any language, is a way of referring to oneself, a way for the speaker to refer to the speaker. So uttering `I' is a way for me to refer to myself, that is, to refer to John Perry. However, uttering` John Perry' is also a way for me to refer to myself. The difference is that uttering `I' is a way of referring to oneself simply in virtue of its meaning, while uttering `John Perry' is only a way of referring to oneself if one is

[7] That is, an Insufficient but Necessary part of a Unnecessary but Sufficient condition. See J.L. Mackie. *The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation* (1974), Oxford University Press.

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named `John Perry'. Thus `I' is suited by its meaning to express beliefs involving the self-notion. Note that our war-hero, sitting in the hospital, could express the thoughts that he was hungry, or tired, or preferred macaroni to hash, by using the word `I', even though he didn't know who he was. One does not have to know who one is, to use the word `I' to express things one knows about oneself in normally self-informative ways, any more than one need to know who one is to feed oneself with the food ones finds in front of one, or to scratch one's own nose.

5 MOTIVATING COMPLEXES

A simple picture of motivation goes like this. A motive is a complex of a belief and a desire. The belief and desire together cause an act; that is, they cause the effectors to move or change in various ways, which given the circumstances, produces various results. The meshing principle tells us that if the belief is true, the results of the act will promote the satisfaction of the desire.

The picture is too simple in various ways. Davidson uses the term `pro-attitude' to cover the numerous desire-like phenomena that can motivate us: desires, wants, urges, intentions, etc. I'll use `doxastic-attitudes' for the numerous belief-like phenomena involved: beliefs, suspicions, perceptions, hypotheses, hunches, etc.

Of particular importance is what we ordinarily call know-how. Know-how is knowledge of how things work, embodied not in words but in habits. Certain actions are ways of bringing about certain results; that is, of performing further actions. Know-how includes basic abilities: I know how to move my little finger in various ways. I know how to make a colon appear on the screen in front of me; with my hand perched over the keyboard in the standard initial position, I move my left little finger to the left and lower, and then press and hold it, while I press and release the right one. If I am a touch typist, I do this when I want a colon to appear without consciously formulating the intentions to move my fingers in certain ways. I may not be able to tell you which fingers I used, without looking at the keyboard. This habit is knowledge, in that the practice of making those

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movements when I want to produce a colon works because the external world is the way it is: the keys are arranged a certain way; my computer works a certain way; and so forth. The know-how is a doxastic attitude, in that it has truth-conditions: that the world is such that those movement are a way of making a colon appear. We should have a term, `belief-how', to handle cases in which the truth-conditions are not met --- if I were using certain foreign keyboards, for example.

Know-how is important because if a motivating complex is actually going to cause an act, it will do so by causing local movements and changes in my body and mind. These movements themselves will almost never be the motivating goal, but rather means to that end in the circumstances as they are taken to be.

A *potential motivating complex* is a structure of doxastic states (beliefs and other states that have truth-conditions) and pro-states (desires and other states that have satisfaction conditions.) There are many potential motivating complexes associated with my self-system right now. I would like to eat a cookie. I believe that there are cookies in the house, for I remember buying some at the grocery store. The desire for a cookie, and the belief that there are some in the house, have become active, in virtue of the more or less accidental choice of cookies as an example. Perhaps the desire was already there, lying dormant. Perhaps writing about cookies has created a desire where there was none before. At any rate, without my forming any intention or making any decision, this complex begins to flesh itself out; that is, to incorporate further beliefs into the complex. I begin thinking about where I put the cookies, and remember that I dumped them into the cookie jar in the kitchen. There is now enough in the motivating complex to constitute a sort of plan of action for satisfying my desire. I know how to get a cookie: position myself before the cookie jar, lift its lid and grab one. I know how to get in position: stand up, and walk to the kitchen. I know how to stand and how to walk. I am free to do so, in the ordinary sense at least; I am not tied down, or paralyzed, or locked in my study.

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As I continue to write about cookies, my desire grows stronger. At some point, it may grow strong enough that the potential motivating complex begins to motivate. I stand up, walk to the kitchen, get a cookie, and eat it. That's how most of my actions come about; for one reason or another a desire, or pro-attitude, starts a process of incorporating beliefs and forming a plan, and once the plan becomes implementable, that is, detailed enough that at least the initial actions are ones I can do just by performing basic actions, it may motivate me. The plan need not be complete. Perhaps I don't remember exactly where I put the cookies, but I am sure they are in the kitchen somewhere. The plan incorporates contingencies; get myself to the kitchen, look around for the cookies, and figure out what to do next.

In spite of having the desire, and its being strong enough to set thinking in motion towards the development of a plan to get a cookie, I haven't gotten out of my chair and started towards the kitchen --- at least not yet. The explanation might have been that I am too lazy, or too depressed, or too involved in the activity of writing to be bothered. But in fact there is another competing motivating complex, that has successfully blocked the cookie complex from getting control of my legs and arms and torso, the effectors required to put its plan into action. I have the desire to lose some weight, and have formed the intention not to snack. I know how to do that too: just sit in this chair and work between meals; if I start to think about snacking, divert my thoughts and think about something else. At all costs avoid the kitchen, where the sight of a cookie or a pretzel might intensify my desire to snack.

These desires compete for control of the effectors required to stand up, go to the kitchen and get a cookie. If I did not have the motivating complex whose lead desire is to lose some weight, the desire for a cookie would be strong enough to get me moving towards the kitchen. If the desire to lose weight had not become active, I would have done so. But as it is, it is active, and strong enough to block my cookie-complex from taking control.

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Here is another way it could have happened. I might have noted that I have two competing desires, and deliberated about which one should guide my action. That would have required a third motivating complex; a desire to act rationally perhaps, together with a belief that if I thought about it I might find reasons to eat a cookie, in this particular circumstance. In my case, and I suspect in yours, this is not all that common. I go through the day doing some things I desire to do, and not doing others, simply because some motivating complexes are in the end stronger than others. Sometimes there are only partial victories. My intention to lose weight keeps me from getting a cookie, but it can't stop me from thinking about cookies. Or, in the case mentioned above, of my angry outburst in a department meeting, my conscience managed to get me to think about how stupid I was being, and perhaps to curtail the speech somewhat, but didn't prevent me from saying what I did.

A perfectly rational creature would, perhaps, never be motivated to act by a motivating complex that had not incorporated all relevant desires and all relevant beliefs. But I am not like that, at least most of the time. Various motivating complexes control various effectors; competing desires wait for some change in circumstances that will change the strengths of the contenders, perhaps seizing control of some part of thought in order to hasten the process. I wake up, and see that it is seven. I believe that I have an appointment on campus at nine. I realize that I should get out of bed, get breakfast, get dressed, and be on my way. But I have a strong desire to stay in bed. I say to myself: ``Get out of bed!" But I don't move. Eventually, before too long, one hopes, things change. I need to roll over to stay comfortable, but once I am moving, my desire to get up manages to seize control. Or the cat jumps on my head, or the dog starts to poke me with his nose in order to be let out, or Frenchie starts to remind me that I have an appointment and by the way she could use some coffee. Or the alarm goes off in the next room, where I put it with just this scenario in mind.

Cases of conscious indecision and deliberation may seduce us into thinking that intentional action is typically the process of conscious deliberation,

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weighing of alternatives, and some kind of free choice among them. Sometimes it is like that. But it seems to me most of the time various beliefs we already have and intentions we have already formed get incorporated into competing motivating complexes and things happen. I am conscious of the competition between the desire to stay in bed and the desire to get started with the day, but I am not consciously deliberating what to do. I decided what to do when I set the alarm, told my wife about the appointment, and didn't put the cat and the dog in the garage. Now it is just a matter of waiting for the desire to stay in bed to grow weak, aided by the changes in circumstances produced by spouse, pets, and clocks, and the desire to get up to grow comparatively strong.

Motivating complexes are not little selves inside of me that survey different parts of my self-notion, put together a package of desires and beliefs, and then develop a strategy to satisfy the desires given the beliefs. Such selves would themselves have to have desires and beliefs, to motivate their actions. Motivating complexes are just cognitions doing what they do.

6. THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Your cognitive states have an effect on my actions only by somehow being represented in my cognitive states; I may have beliefs about your beliefs and desires, and in this way your beliefs and desires may have an indirect effect on me. But my own cognitive states affect what I do simply be being my cognitive states, doing what they do. My perceptions and beliefs and desires affect me in virtue of being my beliefs and desires, not in virtue of my having beliefs about them.

Even when a motivating complex is active, we may not be consciously aware of this activity. But we have the capacity to think about our cognitive states and the effects they have on us. We consider, talk about, criticize, regret, anticipate, form plans to avoid or to encourage the having of various states, and much else. Thinking is an activity rather than a state like belief and desire We think in order to discover, compare, monitor, and affect our desires and beliefs

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and the development of motivating complexes. You ask me if I believe Berkeley is east or west of Santa Cruz. I don't have any disposition to say one thing or the other. When I try to visualize a map of the Bay Area, the results are indecisive. So I conclude I don't have a belief one-way or the other. You tell me that Berkeley is west of Santa Cruz, and show me on a Bay Area map to convince me. I ponder the map, say to myself, ``How odd, Berkeley is a bit west of Santa Cruz,'' and articulating this fact in a conscious way, effect my belief-states.

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Consciousness is a rather difficult topic, about which one best not have confident opinions. Here are some unconfident ones. There are some states that it is like something to be in, and some changes it is like something to go through. Call these *experiences*. We have the ability to be aware of experiences, not merely to *have* them, but to focus on them, think about them, think about their similarities and differences, introduce words for them, make plans for having experiences of some types and avoiding experiences of other types, and so forth. Call this *self-consciousness*, for it is how a person is conscious of that person's own experiences. Having experiences is not the same as being aware of them, although we use the word `consciousness' for both. Having experiences causes us to do various things; being conscious of them and thinking about them causes us to do other things. Having a sudden pain in my shoulder as I extend my arm causes me to wince. Noticing the pain, reflecting on it, and thinking about the circumstances in which it occurred causes me to try to avoid extending it in that way, at least until I have had a chance to take another aspirin.

Experiences have two basic sorts of properties, which I'll call their *feel* and their *content*. My achey shoulder has a certain feel, which I don't like, and try to avoid. The experience also tells me a bit about the world, namely, that something is wrong with my shoulder; that I slept on it awkwardly last night; that the aspirin I took a few hours ago has worn off, and so forth. Some experiences, like aches and pains, are mainly important because of their feel. Others, like the sensations involved in perception, are mainly important because of what they tell us about the rest of the world.

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Experiences change our behavior, often in intelligent ways. We react to some experiences based on what its like to have them; we try to get out of situations that cause unpleasant ones, and stay in situations that cause pleasant ones. But we react to experiences not just because of what it is like to have them, but also because what they show about the rest of the world. Some of this showing does not require us to be conscious of the experiences; nature has built the intelligent reaction into us, innately or through conditioning. Sometimes we know what experiences show because we are conscious of them, think about what they are like, and apply what we know about the world to figure out what they show.

We are conscious of experiences when we need to think about them, classify them, name them, describe them to others, analyze their meaning, and so forth. We are much more likely to remember our experiences, if we have thought about, described them, and so forth.

Consciousness of an experience, self-consciousness, is also an experience. Locke said that we are conscious of all our experiences, but taken literally this doesn't seem to be correct.[8] More plausible is that we can be conscious of each of our experiences, at the time we have them, but may not be. The effort required to be conscious of one's own experiences, much less to try to describe what these are like, is not something people other than philosophers and psychologists often find it worthwhile to expend.

In his version of a Lockean theory of personal identity, H.P. Grice suggests that two simultaneous experiences belong to the same self (or ``total temporary state") if there is, or could be, a single act of introspection of both of them: co-consciousness.[9] Whether or not this is plausible as a definition, it seem true or close to it. The second clause appears to be necessary. It seems that we can be having two experiences, without there being such co-consciousness, although the

[8] Locke, John, 1694. Of Identity and Diversity. Book II, Chapter 27 of Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 2nd edition, London 1694.
[9] Grice, H.P., 1941. Personal Identity. *Mind* 50 (1941). Reprinted in Perry, *Personal Identity* 2nd edition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008:73--95.

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effort to notice an example is self-defeating. But we can infer examples from memory. As I write, there is noise coming from across the street, where someone is using a loud leaf-blower. Writing is an activity where a lot of consciousness seems to be helpful. I see what I write, I am aware of what I think and want to say, I am aware of the feeling of being somewhat dissatisfied with how what I wrote says what I want to say; I am also aware of my anxiety level growing as the deadline approaches (and then begins to recede into the past). However exactly it works, consciousness seems to be helpful in monitoring and managing the welter of desires and concerns involved in such activity. But premature co-consciousness can undermine the process. It now seems that for some time I was hearing the leaf-blower, and even becoming annoyed at hearing the leaf blower, and developing fantasies for making it stop, without being co-conscious of hearing the leaf blower and, say, my rising level of anxiety about the deadline. Now I am co-conscious, and too annoyed to go on. Time to get a drink, and start a new paragraph.

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When the co-consciousness occurred, it was a defeat for the web of motivating complexes that was keeping my thoughts and fingers occupied in writing. I stopped writing and finally took a break until the leaves seemed to be all adequately blown. Co-consciousness doesn't leave everything unchanged. Had I managed to ``keep my mind off' the leaf-blowing, and remain focused on the writing, the leaf-blowing might have been quickly forgotten, and not have played a role in my later narrative of this morning's activities.

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Now suppose I have two experiences at the same time, say having an achey shoulder and a sensation of red. I might not be conscious of either of them, or I might be conscious of one and not the other, or I might be co-conscious of them. Is there another possibility, being conscious of both of them, but not being co-conscious of them? That is if there are two experiences belonging to a single self, can there be consciousness of each of them, without co-consciousness? It seems like this must happen. As I became co-conscious of my experiences of trying to write and my experiences of hearing and being annoyed at the leaf-

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blower, I found in my mind a fully-formed (but immediately rejected) strategy for dealing with the leaf-blower: shouting out the window at the leaf-blowing neighbor and threatening to shoot him if he continues. It seems I couldn't have formulated such a strategy for getting these experiences to cease, if I had merely had them, and not been conscious of them, and thought about them and how they might be brought to an end.

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If this is correct, then I have found in my experience, one part of what it must have been like to be Eve: two streams of consciousness, without co-consciousness.

7. Alienation and Focus

In his (very) short story ``Borges and I", Jorge Luis Borges describes his relationship with the writer Borges:

> The other one, the one called Borges, is the one things happen to. . . . I know of Borges from the mail and see his name on a list of professors or in a biographical dictionary. I like hourglasses, maps, eighteenth-century typography, the taste of coffee and the prose of Stevenson; he shares these preferences, but in a vain way that turns them into the attributes of an actor. It would be an exaggeration to say that ours is a hostile relationship; I live, let myself go on living, so that Borges may contrive his literature, and this literature justifies me. . . . Little by little, I am giving over everything to him, though I am quite aware of his perverse custom of falsifying and magnifying things.[10]

But the other one, the one called Borges, is Borges himself, the one called `I' in the story. One interpretation is that Borges is annoyed by a persona of himself that has been manufactured by the public, perhaps with his help. I think it is more plausible that Borges is annoyed with an aspect of himself. What annoys him is a

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[10] Jorge Luis Borges, ``Borges and I," in *Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings* (New York: New Directions, 1964), pp. 246-47.

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recurrent pattern of preferences, attitudes that control his behavior when he is writing and playing the role of a writer.

When he is not writing, Borges finds himself somewhat alienated from this web of motivating complexes that at other times controls his consciousness and behavior, and in virtue of which he has become famous, and will in some sense survive: `` I am destined to perish, definitively, and only some instant of myself can survive in him."

But there seems to be a bit of a paradox. We have the story in front of us. Someone wrote it and decided to prepare it for publication and include it with Borges' other writing in *Labyrinths*, where it has in fact lived on after Borges' death. This, it seems, must have been Borges the author; that is, the web of motivating complexes that wrote the story must not be the one that is portrayed, by the use of the first person, as the writer. Thus the ending to the story: ``I do not know which of us has written this page." It seems the one called Borges, remembering thoughts he had when not writing, must have written it.[11]

Such alienation as Borges describes is not uncommon, or limited to famous authors. At moments when I want to relax, enjoy the weekend, sleep late, loll around, perhaps go fishing, I find myself ensnared in a number of obligations ``some instant of myself" has somehow contracted, obligations to write, referee, comment on manuscripts and the like. If I had hired an agent to deal with my commitments and obligations, and he was so out of touch with what I really wanted out of life that he had gotten me into all of this, and ruined my weekend, which will either be spent working on these things or spent feeling guilty for not working on them, I would resent that agent very much. But the agent I am annoyed with is just me. I might fall into keeping track of things by giving this agent a name, ``Ambitious John", and that would allow me to allow my resentful thoughts to take a third-person form.

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[11] See my " 'Borges and I' and 'I' " Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 2, 2007: http://www.amherstlecture.org/lectures.html

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It is natural to revert to the third-person when we are alienated from a complex of desires, or, to put it more analytically, when the complex that is governing our present thoughts and words is conflicts in some way with one that does so at other times. The alienated does *not* motivate the current use of the first-person. In this sense the first person expresses identification, but not, I fear, always with a ``truer" or ``higher" complex ---whatever that might amount to--- but simply with the one that is currently in control of conscious thought.

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The war-hero case suggests a rather different sort of alienation. At some point, we may imagine, perhaps in the course of writing the biography, Donald does realize that he is the war hero; he realizes, as he would put it, ``I am Harold". We can suppose he doesn't learn this by recovering his memories, but by slowly filling in the details of Harold's life and eliminating other possibilities for who he might be. He knows that he did the things Harold did, but he doesn't know this in normally first person ways; he doesn't remember doing them. Apart from the new belief about identity, and its immediate consequences --- that Harold isn't dead after all, for example --- the architecture of his mind might not change all that much, at least not right away. He might remain alienated from these beliefs about himself. He might find it hard to think of himself as doing things he cannot remember. It might seem odd to feel pride for Harold's accomplishments, for example, and he might find Harold's interests, tastes, and ambitions, and the acts to which they led, typical of a young relatively uneducated recruit, somewhat foreign to him, being, as he has become, a sophisticated Berkeley graduate student. He might still think about himself in two quite different ways, first-personally and third-personally so to speak, even after he realized that he is Harold.

Some activities require considerable focus. In order to successfully complete a task we are working on, we must put aside thoughts and desires that would interfere, even to the extent of in some sense not registering certain experiences we are having. Focussed athletes ignore pain (I am told). Once I manage to get involved in writing some overdue article, I cannot let myself think

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about the sunny day, the quiet lake, and the hungry fish. Worries about children and bills, not to mention the state of my retirement funds as the economy falters, global warming, and misconceived military adventures, can simply not be incorporated into the complex that motivates me to write, or the complex will lose control of the effectors needed to complete the project.

8. On Being Eve

With the ideas of motivating complexes, co-consciousness and lack of it, amnesia, alienation and focus, I think we can get some handle on what it was like to be Eve. During her Eve White periods, Eve is alienated from the complexes that motivate her in her Eve Black periods, and has amnesia concerning those periods. During her Eve Black periods, Eve is alienated from the complexes that motivate her in her Eve White periods. She doesn't have amnesia with respect to them. She remembers the Eve White parts of her life third-personally, as something ``she'' did; she remains alienated from them, a bit like we imagined the recovering war hero as alienated from his heroic deeds, even after he realizes they are his.

Suppose Eve White is driving to the store.[12] She stops completely at a stop sign and looks both ways, although there is no hint of cross traffic and no sign of a policeman. Eve Black, in conversations with the therapist, claims to have been aware of the stopping, and of the motives for it: excessive timidity and deference to authority. There seem to have been simultaneous conscious experiences, Eve White's ``I am stopping'' experience and Eve Black's ``She is stopping'' experience. This seems to go beyond anything we have in Borges's story, or my ambivalence about working hard, or the case of the war-hero.

In this case we have a perception of the stop sign and a decision to stop motivated by some combination of respect for the law and timidity. Then there seems to be two ways of remembering the event, Eve White's, which would lead her to say, ``I stopped because there was a stop sign and you are supposed to stop

[12] This example is intended to be in the spirit of things described in the book, although it is not drawn directly from the book.

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for stop signs" and Eve Black's which would lead her to say ``She stopped because there was a stop sign and she is a timid fool." Were there, at the time, two awarenesses of the perception and the decision, or simply, later, two records of it, written, so to speak, in different grammatical persons?

When I come to a complete and full stop at a sign on a deserted road with good visibility, I am aware both of doing so because the law requires it, and, often enough, I am also aware of having a somewhat cynical stream of thought to the effect that respect for the law in this case just amounts to timidity and that it would be good for me just once in my life to live on the wild side and to glide through a stop sign in such a situation. Magnify the cynicism until it amounts to complete loathing for the complex of desires and emotions that is in charge of the foot pressing on the brake pedal. Suppose that it is so much a common theme in my thoughts that I use some special name, like `Perry the wuss,' to think them. Still, I am aware both of stopping and of thinking myself a wuss for doing so.

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Suppose now that safe driving is a new habit I'm trying to acquire. It requires considerable focus; otherwise the motivating complex led by the goal of safe and timid driving will lose control. This will happen if my `Perry the wuss' thoughts are allowed surface. While the wuss is in charge, the cynical thoughts, and memories of the cynical thoughts, are simply not allowed to intrude.

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Something like this seems to be the case with Eve. She has a complex of motives, including such things as keeping her marriage intact, managing her household, and tending to the day-to-day obligations of a suburban housewife. She has another complex, including desires to dance, drink, flirt, dress provocatively and the like, that are inconsistent with these. The peculiar mechanism that she developed, originally in response to painful experience as a child, means that when the first complex is in control of her body, she simply will not be aware of the second complex; she will have no memories of the things she did when it was controlling her and no awareness of the scornful thoughts it motivates about her timid behavior, and so on.

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Eve remains a single person; her experiences at any given time constitute a total temporary state in Grice's sense; she *can* be simultaneously aware of them, and often is, as Eve Black testifies. What she cannot do is simultaneously be aware of all of them while the Eve White complex remains in charge.

9. CONCLUSION

The simple theory of selves maintains that selves are simply persons; `self' is a role word, and one's self is the person one is identical with. Nevertheless, there are many situations in which we are inclined to think of selves as inner beings of some sort, some familiar, as cases of temptation, others unfamiliar, and somewhat hard to imagine for most of us, such as Eve's case.

Talk of inner selves is a metaphorical extension of the concept of a self as knower and agent to various motivating complexes that are aspects of a single person. Desires combine with beliefs to form partial plans for satisfying the desires, and seek to control implements of action needed to carry them out. This is not a process directed by some consciousness that consults desires and beliefs as one might consult files or databases. It is a natural process of which one can become conscious, for various reasons and in various circumstances. Motivating complexes may compete for the same implements of action, and conscious thought may be used to form beliefs and desires that decide the issue. But often enough, the competition among desires runs its course without conscious intervention.

Various mechanisms including temporary and partial amnesia for what is done under the influence of one motivating complex or another, alienation, divided attention develop in relatively normal people, and, I tried to argue, provide a basis for understanding what it's like to be Eve.