

CHAPTER 11

Directing Intentions

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1. INTRODUCTION

In his monograph *Demonstratives*,¹ David Kaplan distinguishes between pure indexicals such as “I”, “here”, and “now” and true demonstratives such as “this”, “that”, “he”, and “she” (in some of their uses). The whole set of context-sensitive expressions are officially called “indexicals”; the title of the monograph was chosen for historical reasons. I will use “demonstrative” here to mean true demonstratives and “indexicals” to mean pure indexicals.

Kaplan gives us four theories of demonstratives, three in *Demonstratives* and a fourth in “Afterthoughts.” In *Demonstratives* we find the Fregean Theory, which Kaplan thinks is wrong, the Indexical Theory, which he thinks is not so much wrong as a “mean thing” (528), and the Corrected Fregean Theory, which he advocates there. In “Afterthoughts,”² he replaces the Corrected Fregean Theory with the Directing Intentions Theory, or at least is strongly inclined to do so. (I don’t think he officially gives his final theory a name, but that is the name I will use.)

It’s clear from this that Kaplan finds demonstratives puzzling. He offers only one theory of indexicals; once the right distinctions are made, the facts about the semantics of indexicals are “obvious and incontrovertible.” Clearly the case is otherwise with demonstratives. He says at the end of his discussion in “Afterthoughts”: “There is something I’m not understanding here, and it may be something very fundamental about the subject matter of logic” (590).

1. David Kaplan, *Demonstratives*, in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds., *Themes from Kaplan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 481–564; subsequent references to “*Demonstratives*” are given in parentheses.

2. David Kaplan, “Afterthoughts,” in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds., *Themes from Kaplan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 565–614; subsequent references to “Afterthoughts” are given in parentheses.

I will develop what I take to be version of Kaplan’s Directing Intentions Theory and argue in its favor, and indicate how this version might help with the logical problems that vex Kaplan.

2. FOUR THEORIES OF DEMONSTRATIVES

According to Kaplan, the character of an expression is a function from contexts to appropriate contents. Proper contexts are quadruples of agents, times, locations, and worlds such that the agent is at the location at the time in the world, that is, c_A is at c_L at c_T in c_W . The character of ‘I’, for example, is function that delivers, at each context, the agent of the context as the referent of ‘I’. The characters of words are determined by the conventions of language.

The Indexical Theory, the Corrected Fregean Theory, and the Directing Intentions Theory all apply the Context-Character-Content (or CCC) structure to demonstratives. It remains incontrovertible that demonstratives are devices of direct reference. The problem is that the CCC structure does not seem to give us enough to get us from the occurrence of a demonstrative to a referent. Consider the context consisting of me, now, here, in this world. There are dozens of things I could refer to with ‘that,’ without abusing English: the essay I’m writing, the computer I’m writing it with, the irritating fleck on my glasses, the can of diet Sprite on the table beside me, and so forth. Fixing the conventions of English and the context aren’t enough. Something else is needed.

Once we have found the additional factor that we need, there is another decision to make. Where in the CCC theory to put it: expression, character, context, or content? Table 11.1 summarizes the differences between the four theories on these issues:

Table 11.1.

Theory	What Fills the Gap	Where It Goes in the Theory
The Fregean Theory	A demonstration, thought of as a relation δ , which determines a demonstratum at a time and location	In the proposition expressed
The Indexical Theory	The demonstratum itself	In the context, as an additional parameter
The Corrected Fregean Theory	Same as the Fregean Theory	In the character of the augmented demonstrative itself; ‘That’ becomes ‘That[δ]
The Directing Intentions Theory	A directing intention δ , to refer to the object of a perception	Same as above

3. DEMONSTRATIONS, INTENTIONS, AND WHAT IS SAID

As I said, in “Afterthoughts” Kaplan is at least inclined to replace the Corrected Fregean Theory with the Directing Intentions Theory. In *Demonstratives* he contrasts the determinative role of demonstrations in the case of demonstratives, to the case in which a person points at himself while saying “I”. In the latter case the gesture is not criterial but simply a sort of helpful add-on. In “Afterthoughts” he demotes demonstrations to playing this helpful add-on role, while directing intentions become criterial.

If we trace back the conceptual apparatus of the CCC, we see that content is introduced in terms of the more or less pretheoretical concept of “what is said”. For example, here is how one of Kaplan’s crucial arguments begins:

I return now to the argument that all indexicals are directly referential.

Suppose I point at Paul and say,

He now lives in Princeton, New Jersey.

Call *what I said*—i.e., the content of my utterance, the proposition expressed—‘Pat’. Is Pat true or false? True! Suppose that unbeknownst to me, Paul had moved to Santa Monica last week. Would Pat have then been true or false? False! (512)

Here the commonsense term “what is said” is equated with the more philosophical expression “the proposition expressed,” and intuitions about the application of the concepts of “saying the same thing” and “expressing the same proposition” are used to motivate central theses about content. Given that, the question is something like this. If someone has an intention to refer to X, but gestures toward Y instead, does he end up referring to, and saying something about, and expressing a proposition about X? or Y? Which is determinative, the intention or the demonstration?

In Kaplan’s “Dthat,”³ there is an example that is relevant to this question, which he doesn’t discuss in either *Demonstratives* or “Afterthoughts.” I’d like to discuss it for a bit. This is the case of the lecturer—I’ll call him Professor Z—who intends to point to a picture of Carnap, which he thinks hangs behind him in plain view of the audience, but instead points to a picture of Spiro Agnew, which a prankster has hung there in its place. He says, “The man in *that* picture is the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century.” Has he referred to the picture of Agnew and said something absurd? Or has he referred to the picture he intended to refer to, the picture of Carnap, and said something (arguably) true? To keep things simple I’ll shift to a slightly simpler (though less funny) version. Call the pictures C and A. Professor Z thinks he is pointing at C, although he is really pointing to A. He says, “That is a picture of Carnap.” I’ll call this Case 1. At first glance, this would seem a good test case. If we think the lecturer has referred to A and said

3. David Kaplan, “Dthat,” in P. Cole, ed., *Syntax and Semantics*, vol. 9 (New York: Academic Press, 1978).

something false, we should favor demonstrations and the Corrected Fregean Theory. If we think he has referred to C and said something true, we should favor the Directing Intentions Theory.

But at second glance, this isn't quite right. Although the lecturer has an intention to refer to C, I don't think he has a *directing intention* to refer to C. To make this point, let me introduce Case 2. The picture now hangs on a side wall of the lecture hall. The lecturer, who is myopic, can see the picture, although he cannot make out any details. He simply assumes it is C, the picture of Carnap, which has been hanging there for years. He points to it and says, "That is a picture of Carnap." This alteration brings the example more squarely into the set of things Kaplan is inclined to say in "Afterthoughts," which are limited to perceptual demonstratives.

Now in this case it seems clear that the lecturer's directing intention is to refer to the picture *that he sees*, and that he knows the audience can see. He intends, or we might even say *plans*, to refer to C *by* referring to the picture he can see, because he believes that the picture he sees is C. The directing intention is the intention to refer to the picture he sees, not the intention to refer to C. At least that's how I interpret Kaplan. This interpretation may be accurate; at any rate, I think it is the one that makes his view of directing intentions most plausible.

Now if we extend this understanding of directing intentions to Case 1, in which the lecturer points behind him, to something not in his own visual field, it seems that we no longer have a good test case. The directing intention is to refer to the picture behind him, hanging on the wall. He intends *by* doing that to refer to C, but referring to C is not his directing intention. On this understanding, both the Directing Intention theory and the Corrected Fregean Theory give the same result; he has referred to A, and so said something false.

Here is Case 3. Both A and C hang on the wall on the side of the lecture hall, so that both the lecturer and the audience can see them. Professor Z is not myopic. The pictures are not very close together. Professor Z realizes that C is the one closer to him, and he has a directing intention to refer to that picture, the one closer to him to which he attends. Perhaps the Agnew picture is only at the periphery of his visual field, or not in his visual field at all. But our lecturer is a careless person, and one with a limited sense of how his own body works, and he doesn't know his audience includes many philosophically challenged alumni back for homecoming, who have stepped into the lecture hall mainly to get out of the rain. It doesn't occur to him that anyone would think the person pictured in A could be any philosopher, much less Carnap. He extends his arm and finger in a gesture that any uninformed observer would take to be a demonstration of the picture hanging farther away, the picture of Agnew. So here the directing intention is to C, the demonstration to A; a real test case. What did he say?

The example seems to provide a test case in the sense that the Corrected Fregean view and the Directing Intentions view give different

results. But unfortunately, it isn't very clear which result is right. What is clear is that the lecturer intended to say something about C, and that many in the audience, through no fault of their own, took him to have said something about A. We are pretty clear about what he intended to say, and what he was understood as saying. But what did he say?

Case 3 doesn't answer our question, but it does lead us to an important point. I think we have a fairly robust concept of *what someone said*, and *what was said* by an utterance, and *when X and Y have said the same thing*. The concept is robust enough to support many of the arguments for which philosophers like Kaplan, Kripke, Donnellan, and Wettstein have used it. But in the final analysis it does not seem to be quite the right concept on which to erect semantic theory.

The problem is that there is a forensic element to our ordinary concept of what is said. Saying something is often a social act, which has effects on others in virtue of the words used, their meanings, and other publicly observable indications of the speaker's intentions ("perlocutionary effects," in Austin's terminology). One is held responsible for some of these effects. Suppose a member of the audience goes off and buys a portrait of Agnew, thinking it to be a portrait of Carnap, and hangs it in his hallway with the words "Rudolf Carnap: The greatest philosopher of the twentieth century" under it. Then he is made fun of and humiliated by his better educated friends. He could justifiably complain to the lecturer, "You *said* that [pointing to A] was a picture of Carnap, whom you also said was the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century. I took it on your authority, and that's why I bought another picture of the same man. You may not have *meant* to say it, but because you were careless, you *did* say it." In this case I'm somewhat inclined to side with, and definitely inclined to sympathize with, the philosophically challenged alumnus. I'm inclined to agree that Professor Z did say something that entailed that Agnew was the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century, even though he didn't mean to. Because he was careless, he said something he didn't mean to say.

On the other hand, suppose the audience was composed completely of worshipful philosophy graduate students who know the lecturer and his careless habits well and also know that great philosophers, or at least great logical positivists, don't have slicked-back hair, sharkskin suits, and shyster-like expressions. None of them doubts for a minute that the lecturer intends to refer to C. If after the lecture a student says, pointing at C, "Professor Z said that was a picture of Carnap," I would be somewhat inclined to say he spoke truly. I would surely let the remark pass, if I thought no one in the audience could have misunderstood the lecturer. Still, it seems the student would have spoken more accurately had he said, "It was clear that Professor Z meant to point at that picture [C], and so even though he didn't, and perhaps strictly and literally said that that [pointing to A] was a picture of Carnap, he communicated to all of us, who realized that he was just being careless as usual, that that [C]

was a picture of Carnap.” On balance, in this case, it seems that the forensic element in “says” dominates, and would push us toward the demonstrative theory. However, I think for this reason, it isn’t quite the concept we need for semantics.

The concept of “what is said” wasn’t really designed for the philosophy of language; we need to *explicate* it, as Carnap would say, that is, to replace it with a new somewhat more precise concept, with a somewhat different extension. The official name I’ll suggest for the new concept is “locutionary content”—“locutionary” is another term borrowed from Austin, who spoke of the “locutionary act.” And I think the concept of locutionary content, in the case of demonstratives, should be tied to directing intentions even in cases, like our second case, where what is said seems, on balance, to go with demonstrations. We need a concept very close to what is said, but one that seals off the forensic, issues. (We don’t have to use the term “locutionary content” all the time, by the way. The explicator can legitimately usurp the original word, “says” in this case, for serious theoretical work once the explication is finished.) To make this case and develop the concept, we need to look more closely at the structures of beliefs and intentions that govern our uses of demonstratives.

4. REFERENTIAL PLANS AND LOCUTIONARY CONTENT

Let’s go back to Case 2, where Professor Z is myopic and the picture of Carnap has been switched for one of Agnew. What does Professor Z intend? It’s a mistake to think that we can adequately grasp his intention with a single clause, such as “he intends to refer to the picture of Carnap.” We need to see his intentions as forming a structure, a plan, whereby he intends to do one thing by doing another. Professor Z’s plan looks something like this. He intends to say, of C, that it is a picture of Carnap. He intends to do that by referring to C, and predicating that property of it.

His plan then includes the subgoal of referring to C. How does he plan to do that? His plan is to refer to C by looking at C and referring to the picture he is looking at. This is where his plan goes awry. The plan depends on the truth of the proposition that the picture he is looking at is C, which it isn’t. He does what he intends to do (refer to the picture he is looking at) but not what he intended to accomplish *by* doing that, namely, refer to C. And so, eventually, he doesn’t say what he intended to say.

The belief that he was looking at the remembered picture of Carnap was part of Z’s motivation for uttering the sentence he did. There were lots of other beliefs that were part of the motivation, in the sense that had he not believed them, he wouldn’t have uttered the sentence he did. He had to believe that “Carnap” was Carnap’s name, for example. These were not part of what he said, or of what he intended to say. They are not the beliefs he was *expressing* by speaking as he did. The belief he intended

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to express was the belief that a certain picture, *C*, was a picture of the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century. This is a belief he held before he came in the room; he would have continued to hold it even if he had realized that the pictures had been switched. Had he realized that he wouldn't have been under the illusion that he could refer to *C* by referring to the picture on the wall, and wouldn't have been under the illusion that he could express his belief in the way he tried to do. But he still would have had the belief he was trying to express.

In contrast, the belief that his gesture would pick out *C* was not part of *Z*'s motivation for uttering what he did. The gesture is not part of his referring, but something intended to help the audience identify that to which he was referring. The careless gesture misled the alumni in a way he was responsible for, and our ordinary forensic concept of what it said is sensitive to this. But I think our semantical concept of locutionary content should not be.

A *prima facie* plausible principle is that if one is sincere, and semantically competent, and makes no verbal slips, what one says will have the same content as the belief one intends to express by saying it. If I sincerely say, "George W. Bush is from Texas," then one can assume that the content of the belief that I was trying to express is that George W. Bush is from Texas.⁴ But, because of the way indexicals and demonstratives work, if for no other reason, we can't really stick with this principle without qualification. Suppose I believe that George W. Bush is from Texas, and I wish to express this belief by saying, "He is from Texas," in a situation in which you and I have just turned on the television late at night, and a very Dubbya-looking fellow has appeared on our screen, making very Dubbya-like expressions and gestures. But it isn't really George W. Bush; it is the George W. Bush mimic that appears every so often on Jay Leno's *Tonight Show*. My plan to express my belief that George W. Bush is from Texas miscarries because I mistakenly thought that in the context we were in I could refer to George W. Bush as "he," exploiting the fact that I was seeing him on the television, but I couldn't.

Now compare this with a case just like it, except that I have actually not looked at the television. I am just going over people in my head and thinking about them. I get to George W. Bush and say, "He is from Texas." I assume you will ask about whom I speak, and I'll say, "George W. Bush." You take me to be, by mistake, referring to the fellow on television, when I meant to refer to George W. Bush. But in this case, it doesn't seem to me that I do refer to that fellow; I refer to George W. Bush, the fellow I was thinking about. My intention was not to exploit

4. Given the international audience for Kaplan's work, perhaps I should point out that George W. Bush, often called "Dubbya," is the president of the United States as I write, and is the son of another president also named George Bush. Since I believe interest in Kaplan's work will endure, perhaps I should observe that the United States is a North American nation that played a leading role in world affairs throughout the twentieth century.

the supposed fact that George W. Bush was on television, for I wasn't looking at the television and hadn't made that mistake. It is really very easy to refer to things. Just think about them, and say "he" or "she" or "it".

In the first case, I intend to refer to the person we both see on television—that is my directing intention—and by doing that refer to George W. Bush. In that case, I don't refer to George W. Bush, don't say what I intended to say, and don't say something that has the content of the belief that I was trying to express. In the second case, my directing intention is to refer to the person I am thinking of, and I do refer to him, I do say what I intended to say, and I do say something that has the content of the belief I was trying to express. (I'm here beginning to extend the concept of directing intention beyond the perceptual cases Kaplan has in mind, which I will continue to do.)

Now here is an intermediate case. I am thinking of George Bush, and that he is from Texas, and decide to express this belief by saying, "He is from Texas," using "he" to refer to the person I am thinking of. Just as I am about to blurt this out, I notice the fellow on television and point to him, as a way of saving you the trouble of asking about whom I am speaking. I don't intend to refer to George W. Bush by referring to the fellow we see on television; I intend to refer to George W. Bush by referring to the person I am thinking of, and then, in addition, help you to identify that person by pointing to him. My gesture has a "uptake-helping" rather than a locutionary purpose. In this case, it seems to me that I say that George W. Bush is from Texas and, in addition, do something intended to be helpful to you in understanding what I say, that is in fact quite unhelpful, although somewhat amusing.

Now perhaps in this case the forensic aspects of our ordinary concept of "what is said" may incline us to think that it is not clear what I said, or even that I said, of the *Tonight Show* comedian, that he is from Texas. Be that as it may, I think for the philosophy of language we want a concept that is closely tied to the actual structure of intentions, and immune to forensic issues; that is, we want locutionary content, that depends unambiguously on the actual structure of intentions, and not at all on the listener's recognition or misrecognition of them, however reasonable these might have been.

The relevant facts about the speaker are his knowledge of the conventions of his language, his beliefs about the things he is talking about, and his identifications and misidentifications of these things with the objects that it is possible for him to indexically or demonstratively refer to. These are the factors that enter into the speaker's plan to express, with language, the propositions that he wants to express. If this plan is flawed, because he has made false identifications, then his utterance will not have the locutionary content that he plans on it having, and our prima facie plausible principle that sincere competent speakers express the belief they are trying to express is violated. But the problem will be traced to

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problems with their beliefs, not mistakes others make in reading their intentions.

Another example. I say, "I think lima beans taste horrible," and intend to emphasize the point by making a horrible expression, but instead make an expression that makes my audience think I am imagining eating a chocolate chip cookie or some other delicious food. They will be very confused. But that's irrelevant to the locutionary content. I expressed my belief but did a very poor job conveying it.

On the other hand, suppose I say, "I think lima beans taste like this," and then make the chocolate chip cookie-eating face, thinking I am making a lima beans-eating face. My intention is to get at the property of tasting horrible *as* the property suggested by the expression I make. But I am wrong about the expression I make. So I don't say what I intend to say. The expression had a locutionary job to do, rather than an uptake-helping one.

I'm now done contrasting locutionary content with our ordinary, semiforensic concept of what is said. Having completed the explication, from now on I will use "says" and its cognates to mean locutionary content.

5. CONNECTIONS AND DIRECTING INTENTIONS

Our ability to think about particular things depends on our having some *connection* to them. Such connections are involved in various kinds of thinking and are exploited when we refer to the things. Examples: I am aware of a pain in my toe; I see the house across the street; I hear an explosion; I hear a person talking; I hear a person talking on the phone; because of earlier perception, I have an idea of a thing and remember it; people are talking about someone, using his name, and I hear the name; someone has written an article about a certain place, and I read the article, perceiving a name for the place; someone refers to something he sees as "that man", and I am aware that he has referred to a man. Each of these ways of thinking about a thing involves having a relation to it, some rather direct, as when we feel our own pains or see objects, some much more tenuous and mediated by the minds and words of others, as when I read about a place I've never visited in a guidebook or hear a snippet of a conversation in which someone is referred to with a name or demonstrative.

If we can think about something, we can refer to it. If a name is available, we can use that. I come upon a conversation in the lounge about someone named Jack. I can wonder who Jack is; I can form hypotheses, which will be true or false depending upon who he is. I can ask, "Who is Jack?" If a name is not available, I can make one up. "Let's call the girl I remember from sixth grade 'Shirley' until we find our her real name." But the easiest way to refer to an object we are thinking about is to use a demonstrative: "that girl", "this pain", "that house", "this guy you call 'Jack' " or simply "he".

In considering what character to assign a simple demonstrative like “that”, we begin by noting that it can be simply a way of referring to the object one is thinking about. If you are thinking about an object, you can refer to that object by saying “that”. You will be referring to it *as* the object you are thinking about. So the appropriate character rule will be: “that” refers to the object that c_A is thinking about at c_T at c_L in c_W . If we could get by with this character rule for “that,” then we would not need to supplement the demonstrative with the directing intention. The referent of “that” in c will be the object about which the speaker is thinking at c_T in c_W .

However, I think that we need to distinguish a number of characters for “that”, corresponding to the types of connections that one can have to objects one thinks about, and choose to exploit in order to refer to those objects. The reason for this is that when one uses a demonstrative (or an indexical or name), part of what one is doing is opening a *second* connection for one’s audience. The first connection is simply that constituted by one’s own remarks. If I say, “He is a fool,” you understand that, if my remark is true, someone is a fool. Who? The person I referred to with “he”. That’s one connection you have to the person about whom I am talking, one way you can think of him. If my remark comes out of the blue, that will be all you can discern about this fellow; you have only one channel of information about him, what I say. But usually you will take my use of “he” to be tied to some *additional* connection that I have to the person, that you can at least potentially use as the basis of a second connection. For example, you will take it that I am referring to the person I am looking at, who you may then look at also. Or you may take it that I am referring to the person who has been the topic of conversation, or the fellow I am talking to on the phone.⁵

Kaplan’s demonstratives take the form “that[δ]”, where δ is the directing intention. I suggest that δ be the *type* of directing intention, where the typing is by the type of connection that the speaker is exploiting. A theory of such types could, I think, be based on the concepts of epistemic and pragmatic relations, which I have developed in various places.⁶ But for present purposes I’ll just assume that any theory of demonstratives can incorporate a theory of connection types suitable to the range of discourse treated by the theory.

I am assuming that although it is easy to say something about a thing or object one can think of, and although one can say something (in my explicated sense) with no thought at all about the effects on others, nevertheless language is mostly for communication and provides us the

5. See John Perry, “Understanding Demonstratives,” in Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley, eds., *Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).

6. See John Perry, “Rip Van Winkle and Other Characters,” in *The European Review of Philosophy*, Jérôme Dokic, ed., vol. 2, *Cognitive Dynamics*, 13–39; reprinted in John Perry, *The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays*, enlarged edition (Stanford, Calif.: CSLI Publications, 2000).

resources to say what we have to say in such a way that we can control, to a certain extent, the effects we have on our listeners. Why, then, one might ask, doesn't English come with a variety of "thats", subscripted so that listeners can more easily discern *how* the speaker intends to refer to an object, and so the speaker might more easily control how the listener takes him to be referring? The answer to this question is, I think, that "that" is designed for use without further elaboration when it is pretty obvious how the speaker intends to refer, and easily accommodates further elaboration, in the form of nouns, appositives, and the like, when needed.

One might doubt, on general principles, that our referential plans are so fine-grained as this theory seems to suppose. I suggest some thought and language experiments. Look at something. Refer to it as "that". I'm now looking at the Sprite can on the table, and I just said, out loud, "That is empty." Now I'm not looking at it. I'm remembering taking a full can of Sprite from the refrigerator yesterday. I just said out loud, "That can is now empty." I was referring to the can I referred to as the can connected to me through this memory, not as connected to me through perception. I think it is the same can as the one I can see; I'm almost certain. If later I find a relatively fresh and pristine, but empty, can of Sprite on the desk where I worked yesterday, and inspect the can on the table and find many signs that it has been there for some time—it contains the remains of a couple of cigars, a few discarded bent paper clips, and the carcasses of a couple of dead flies—I will reconsider. It seems that the can I took from the refrigerator yesterday is on the desk; the can on the table is a different one, which I drank from last week and then used as a mini-wastebasket. So I said two different things.

Were they both true? That will depend on what I meant by "empty". Did I mean "contains no Sprite" or "contains nothing at all"? The word "empty" can be used to get at a number of properties, depending on what one intends to say with it, and it can also be used less definitely. If I meant, in my first remark, about the can on the table, that it contains no Sprite, what I said was true. If I meant *completely* empty, in the state required by the city of Palo Alto if I am to toss it in the recycling bin, what I said was false. If I had no intention either way, then I didn't say anything clear enough to have a definite truth value one way or the other.

Suppose I see a man standing across the street. I decide to say something about him. I don't recognize him as anyone I have ever seen or heard of before. He just strikes me as worthy of mention. So I say, "He looks old and tired." Here my referential plan is quite simple. There is a way of referring to the man one sees, no matter who he is. You just look at him and say "He".

A minute later I don't see him any longer. I remember him. I want to refer to the man I remember. Again, it is quite simple. I just say "he." It's a perfectly good way of referring to the man I remember, whoever he was. I may sound stupid, if I say out loud, to no one in particular, "He

looked old and tired.” If I am talking to someone, it may not be at all helpful to my communicative goals. The person to whom I am talking may have no idea to whom I am referring. Still, by my lights, I refer to the man I remember. “He” is a device we can use to refer to any male we can think of.

Suppose I mistakenly take the man standing across the street to be George W. Bush. I say, “That man is from Texas.” The person I believe to be from Texas is George W. Bush. I intend to refer to George W. Bush and say he is from Texas. I plan to refer to George W. Bush by referring to the man across the street, which I know how to do. I think this will be a way of referring to George W. Bush because of my false belief that George W. Bush is the man standing across the street. In this case I have referred to the man across the street and said he was from Texas. The directing intention is to refer to the man across the street; referring to George W. Bush is the intended result.

The man across the street, whom I take to be George W. Bush, is tossing pretzels in the air and catching them in his mouth. I point to him and tell my grandson, “President Bush is tossing pretzels in his mouth. That’s very dangerous.” I intended to refer to the man across the street by referring to George W. Bush, which I knew I could do by saying “President Bush.” The directing intention (now extended to proper names) was to refer to that man I think of when I think “George W. Bush”; the expected upshot was to refer to the man across the street; I planned to refer to the man across the street by referring to President Bush. But I failed; I referred to President Bush and quite possibly said something false about him.

So, my understanding of directing intentions is this. I think you can use a demonstrative to refer to anything you can think of. It may be something you remember, or see, or hear, a sensation you are having, someone you are talking to on the phone, or whatever. However you think of it, if you can think of it you can form an intention to refer to it, and can do so. If, in the middle of a lecture, I stop, look into the distance, and say, “That man is a fool,” intending to refer to some government official, I will have referred to that person, and quite possibly said something true. Reference is easy.

Communication is not so easy. Doing it well requires some skills that most children lack to a certain extent, and some people never acquire. Many children regularly use demonstratives for things that they can see, but which the people they are trying to communicate with cannot identify. My favorite example, because it has happened to me so often, is a child in the backseat of a car I’m driving telling me all about something I can’t possibly find without taking my eyes off of the road, turning around, and following their gaze. Many adults regularly use mystery anaphors, where they clearly intend to add to what has been said about some thing referred to earlier, but there is no earthly way of knowing which thing they have in mind. But I digress.

Often one will intend to refer to something one is thinking of, perhaps something one sees or remembers, and intend thereby to refer to an object that has certain further properties, besides being the thing that one sees, remembers, or whatever. One thinks that the thing one sees or remembers or hears is the thing or person that bears a certain name, or falls under a certain description. In this case one intends not only to refer to the thing or person one sees, hears, remembers, or whatever, but also to refer, by doing that to the thing that bears the name or fits the description. Professor Z intends to refer to C by saying “that”; and so forth. The first intention, the one that is easy, is the directing intention. The further referential intentions are fulfilled only if the identifications are correct. What one says, in the explicated sense, depends on one’s directing intention. Kaplan is right in “Afterthoughts.”

6. RISK AND REFERENCE

Let’s return to Professor Z, Case 2. There he is, poor myopic thing. He wants to refer to C, the picture of Carnap. According to me, this is extremely easy for him to do. He has an idea of C; he has seen it many times; he remembers it well. All he has to do is think of it, as something he remembers, and say, “That is a picture of Carnap.” He will have definitely said what he wants to say. That seems like the safest way to do it.

Instead, he looks over at the wall and focuses on the picture he sees, however myopically, hanging there. He forms the intention to refer to the picture he sees and thereby refer to C. Why does Professor Z settle on such a risky plan to refer to C, a plan whose success is hostage to his myopic vision?

He settled on the risky plan because his intention to say that C is a picture of Carnap is itself part of a larger plan, to communicate something to his audience. Perhaps he wants his audience to know what Carnap looked like. Or perhaps undergraduates have been defacing the picture, taking it to be merely some nonphilosopher in the university’s past, perhaps the donor of the room, or a much-revered groundskeeper from the 1950s; if they realize it is a picture of *Carnap*, they will behave more appropriately toward it. He can’t achieve such goals merely by saying that C is of Carnap; he has to say it in a certain way. He has to refer to C in a way that will bring it about that C is playing a certain role in the cognitive life of the audience, so that they can identify C perceptually, and thus find out what Carnap looked like, or find out which picture deserves honorable treatment. It is this aspect of directing intentions, as I am interpreting them, that makes it reasonable to call them “directing”; often they are intentions to refer to an object in such a way that part of the audience’s recognition of one’s intention will involve directing their attention to an object connected to them (or an object that thus becomes connected to them) in a certain way.

Now it is possible, on my view, for Professor Z to refer to C as the picture he remembers while *pretending* to refer to it as the picture he sees. Then he will say something true, even if he is wrong about what picture he sees; if he is right, his remark will have the desired effect; if he is wrong, and the picture he sees is not C, he will still have said something true, in our nonforensic sense of “says”. This is possible; however, it is not so easy to do. The simplest way to have people take you to be referring to something you see as something you see is to refer to it that way. It would also be rather pointless; Professor Z wouldn’t have spared himself the responsibility for the consequences of his utterance, simply because he managed to say something true in a sense of “says” in which such responsibility is ignored.

Most likely, his directing intention is somewhat impure. He intends to refer to a picture he takes himself to be connected to in two ways, as one he remembers, and one he sees. In that case, it won’t be clear what he said, and there may be no definite answer to the question whether he said something true in a misleading way or something false in a straightforward way.

7. COMPLEX CONNECTIONS

My recommendation for demonstratives within the CCC framework is then as follows. First, we should distinguish among a number of types of connections that one can have to objects: $\delta_1, \delta_2, \dots, \delta_n$, guided by the range of cases we want the theory to handle. Then the character of “That[δ_i]” will be a function from a context c to the object that has connection δ_i to c_A at c_T in c_W . Demonstratives that do not get us to an object, even with a directing intention, will need to be given some appropriate treatment.

This way of looking at things might lead in one direction that will be helpful to the *logic* of demonstratives. Our theory of connections might allow for complex connections, which could induce a logic. When we refer to something, we create a connection for our audience; they can think of the object we refer to as the object we refer to. This also provides the speaker with a new connection to the same object just referred to. Once I have referred to an object, both I and my audience can exploit the connection I have created to refer to the same thing again. It is in this way, I think, that we should deal with anaphoric connections—a strategy similar to that adopted by a number of linguists and philosophers of language who do not find Kaplan’s claim that demonstratives and pronouns are ambiguous very inviting.

Consider the sentence “If he waits for a bus, he waits for a bus”. The first “he”, let’s suppose, is a demonstrative with a perceptual directing intention. If the second “he” is anaphoric, and the anaphoric “he” is simply a homonym of the demonstrative “he”, as Kaplan supposes, then we can account for the feel of logical validity, but not as a part of the logic

of demonstratives. If, on the other hand, we consider the second ‘‘he’’ as also a perceptual demonstrative, then the truth of the conditional seems not to be a matter of logic at all but to depend on the fact that the two exploited perceptual connections are of the same fellow.

It seems, however, that anaphors are ways of exploiting connections established by previous directing intentions. We are talking on the phone; you say, ‘‘Elwood called again.’’ I have particular idea to which of several people named Elwood you are referring; perhaps you are referring to an Elwood I don’t even know. I am able to reply, however, in a way that refers to the particular Elwood you referred to. I may ask, ‘‘Is Elwood becoming a problem?’’ I am referring to the same person to whom you referred; I may be trying to discern which Elwood you are referring to—but, equally, I am trying to discern which Elwood I am referring to. Or I may say, ‘‘Elwood calls me a lot, too,’’ making a guess and referring in a nondeferential way to the Elwood I take you to be referring to. Then you may reply, ‘‘No, *he* doesn’t call me, I am talking about a different Elwood.’’ Your ‘‘he’’ refers to my Elwood.

There seems to be room, then, for a theory of complex connections, which a theory of anaphors could use. An anaphoric directing intention points at another directing intention and has the same intended referent as the intention pointed at:

The referent of ‘‘that[$\delta_A \rightarrow \delta_X$]’’ in c = the referent of ‘‘that[δ_X] in c .

We would see our problematic sentence as having either the form

If $he[\delta_p]$ waits for a bus, $he[\delta_A \rightarrow \delta_p]$ waits for a bus,

which is valid, or

If $he[\delta_p^1]$ waits for a bus, $he[\delta_p^2]$ waits for a bus,

which is not. In the latter sentence I have used superscripts to distinguish between the two perceptual directing intentions; this means the world of the context will have to have facts in it that provide the possibility of the two directing intentions being intentions to refer to different objects; the sentence will be true at context c if in c_W the object intended by δ_p^1 and that intended by δ_p^2 will be the same.

At this point, however, my ability to both pursue anything that is a plausible interpretation of Kaplan and think about things in my own way sort of runs out of gas. This is because I naturally think in terms of a theory of utterances, so that different utterances of the same demonstrative, each with its own directing intention, anaphoric or not, would occur at different times and would be causally relevant to the production of different tokens of the same word. But Kaplan’s theory is not a theory of utterances, but rather a theory of sentences in context, and the sentences importantly need not be uttered in the world of the contexts in which they are considered. So this is probably a good time for me to stop.