Williams on the Self and the Future[*]

By John Perry

Is personal identity simply bodily identity? Or is it based on a different principle, continuity of consciousness or links of memory? Locke thought the latter, and so, with various important qualifications, do Sydney Shoemaker and a number of other contemporary philosophers who have written on the problem of personal identity (Locke, 1694; Shoemaker, 1963, 1970). Both Locke and Shoemaker bolster the case for the memory theory by appealing to cases of putative body transfer. In a body transfer case, a person has one body at one time, and a different body at a later time. In other words, there is personal identity without bodily identity. The advocate of the view that personal identity consists in, or at least implies bodily identity must resist taking these cases to be real cases of body transfer. This Bernard Williams has done in a number of essays, culminating in the imaginative and elegant "The Self And the Future."(Williams, 1970). In this essay, I try to understand the arguments Williams has given for resistance.

1. Putative Examples of Body Transfer

The most famous examples of putative body transfer are Locke's cobbler and prince and Shoemaker's case of Brownson. Locke doesn't explain why the cobbler he imagines comes to have memories of a prince, but says that the cobbler would be the same person as the prince, but not the same man. Shoemaker gives us more details. Brown's brain is transplanted into Robinson's cranium. The survivor of this operation Shoemaker calls "Brownson." We can represent this sort of case with a diagram in which the horizontal rows represents sameness of body:

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Earlier Time	Later Time
Brown	Brown's body, no brain
Robinson	Brownson [Person with Robinson's body and Brown's brain]

Shoemaker's Case

The diagram is neutral as to the question of personal identity. We can ask whether Brownson is Brown, Robinson, or neither. Shoemaker says that, assuming Brownson has the memories of Brown, we should cautiously conclude that Brownson is Brown. If we conclude this, then this is a case of body transfer, though Brown still has part of his original body, his brain.

Since Shoemaker put forward the Brownson case, writers, including Shoemaker, have considered more abstract examples, in which the brain itself isn't transferred. The properties of the brain that are relevant to memory (and any other mental traits deemed important) are somehow duplicated in another brain, whose owner is imagined to have a mental life exactly similar in relevant respects to that which actual brain transfer would have produced. Since this more abstract case is the sort variations on which Williams discusses, I'll call it "the basic case":

Earlier Time	Later Time
A	Left open
B	*B*-body person [B's body, *A*'s memories]

The Basic Case

Is the *B*-body person *A*? or B? Or neither? In Shoemaker's case, it was the memories and not the brain that were important in arguing that Brownson was Brown. The brain's importance derived only from the fact that it was the physical basis of the memories. It seems then that the same arguments would apply in the basic case. Williams himself states these arguments very effectively in "The Self and the Future," on pages 47 to 50—- but only as a preparation to rejecting them.

Williams thinks that persons are material objects, that personal identity is bodily identity, and that the putative cases of body transfer should not be accepted as real. His strategy is to lead us to consider variations on the basic case. When we explore our intuitions about these variations, we find the force of the arguments for the memory theory based on simpler cases fading away. In an early paper, "Personal Identity and Individuation," he puts forward his reduplication argument.[i] Later, in "The Self and the Future," he puts forward what I shall call the non-duplication argument. I shall consider each of these.

2. THE REDUPLICATION ARGUMENT

In the reduplication argument, Williams asks us to consider a variation on the basic case. Instead of having one person at the later time with *A*'s memories and someone else's body, we imagine having two. Given that the basic case does not involve an actual transfer of the brain, we can suppose that the very same process that in the basic case led to the *B*-body person having *A*'s memories, is applied twice. Thus both the *B*-body person and the C-body person have *A*'s memories.

Earlier Time	**Later Time**
A	No person has *A*'s body
B	*B*-body person [B's body, *A*'s memories]
C	C-body person [C's body, *A*'s memories]

The Reduplication Case

This sort of case presents the memory theorist with a dilemma. Both the *B*-body person and the C-body person have that relation to *A* that was deemed sufficient for personal identity in the basic case. But then both of them should be *A*. But they clearly are not identical with one another. They have different bodies, will have different perceptions when they awake from the operation, and so will soon have different memories. They can't find out what each other is thinking or doing by introspection. But since identity is a "one-to-one" relation, we can't consistently maintain all of the following:≠

1. The *B*-body person = *A*

2. The C-body person = *A*

3. The *B*-body person ≠ the C-body person

Which of these will the memory theorist give up? It would be absurd to give up (3). Giving up either (1) or (2) undermines the idea that personal identity consists in links of memory. (There can be no sufficient reason for giving up (l) and (2) without the other, since the claims have exactly the same basis.) Thus the reduplication argument forces us to rethink the power of the basic case.

The logic of this argument seems to be this: *A* description of some basic case is given, neutral on questions of personal identity. From this description, we can see that some relation obtains between the memory donor and the survivor (*A* and the *B*-body person). Is this relation sufficient for identity? If it is, changing the example in ways that do not affect it should not affect the question of identity. But certain changes give us a variation in which the relation is clearly not sufficient for identity, namely, adding another survivor (the C-body person) who also has the relation in question to the memory donor. Of course, one can make these changes only if the relation in question is "duplicable"—is the sort of relation that can obtain between *A* and both the *B*-body person and the C-body person.

In Williams's "Personal Identity and Individuation, Charles claims to be Guy Fawkes and supports this claim with detailed memory-like reports of Fawkes's life. "Appears to remember events from Fawkes's life in great detail," is a duplicable relation,

which two people might have to Fawkes. But this relation would surely not be supposed, even by those most sanguine about transfer of bodies, to be sufficient for personal identity. Any inclination to suppose that Charles is Fawkes must be based on the assumption that this relation is good evidence for some other relation, itself sufficient for identity. The real question is the duplicability of this other relation.

Consider the Shoemaker case. Suppose Charles is to Fawkes as Brownson is to Brown: Charles actually has Fawkes brain, which has somehow survived with all of its memories intact. The possibility of a competitor with similarly accurate sensory impressions is not a problem for the advocate of body transfer. This competitor would simply seem to remember being Fawkes. But Charles, because his current memory impressions have the right sort of causal link to Fawkes's life, could be said to really remember. The advocate of body transfer could say that the important relation, the one that permits there to be one person where there are two bodies, has not been duplicated.

Williams notes that it is an advantage of the Shoemaker example that it does not seem to admit of the reduplication problem. But he points out that a natural extension of the example does: "consider, not the physical transfer of brains, but the transfer of information between brains" (Williams, 1970 p. 79). The relevance of this to the Shoemaker case, and to the project of rebutting the argument that personal identity is not bodily identity, is not perfectly clear because it seems that only one successful example of bodily transfer needs to be provided to disprove the claim that bodily identity is sufficient for personal identity. The following like of argument is open to Williams. Whatever considerations there are in favor of counting brain transfer as body transfer are also reasons to regard information transfer as body transfer. But the reduplication argument shows we cannot regard information transfer as body transfer, so these reasons must not be good enough. Further, as Williams points out, the reduplication argument is certainly an embarrassment to any memory theorist who doesn't want possession of a particular brain to be a condition of personal identity, and the motivations behind memory theories are such that most would not.

But what sort of embarrassment is it? Williams says the principle of the argument is that "identity is a one-one relation, and that no principle can be a criterion of identity for things of type T if it relies only what is logically a one-many relation between things of type T" (Williams, 1970 p.21). What the reduplication case shows (with the details suitably filled in to be relevant to a particular account of personal identity in terms of memory) is that the memory relation proposed as the criterion of identity is not logically one-one.

Does it follow from the fact that identity is logically one-one, that any criterion for identity must be logically one-one? It is not even clear that it follows that it must be, as a matter of fact, one-one. For example, "has the same fingerprints" is perhaps, as a matter of fact, but surely not as a matter of logical necessity, a one-one relation, yet this is certainly, in the ordinary sense, a criterion of personal identity. It would still be so, even if in every couple of million cases two or three people did share the same fingerprints. *A* relation that is not one-one can be quite good evidence for one that is one-one, so long as there are not too many exceptions. Presumably then some special philosophical notion of "criterion" is at work here. Even if we require some "conceptual" or "logical,' connection between the criterion and what it is a criterion for? the inference in question may not hold. Using, for example, Shoemaker's explanation of the term in *Self-knowledge and Self-Identity*, a criterion for personal identity would be a relation that could not possibly not be good evidence for personal identity. All that seems to be required of such a relation is that, in each possible world, it is good evidence for personal identity. All this seems to require is that in each possible world the relation in question be one-one with but a few exceptions.

Perhaps a "criterion of identity" is to be some relation between persons which the memory the theorist produces as giving an analysis of the very meaning of "is the same person as." Williams's remark, that his point could be made more rigorously in terms of "sense and reference of uniquely referring expressions," suggests this (21). Such analyses are often developed in terms of equivalence relations and equivalence classes.

An equivalence relation is one with the following properties: It is transitive, which means that if *x* has the relation to *y,* and *y* has it to z, then *x* has it to z. It is symmetrical,

which means that if *x* has it to *y,* then *y* has it to *x.* And it is weakly reflexive, which means that if *x* has it to anything, *x* has it to *x.* Equivalence relations break populations up into equivalence classes. These classes contains only things that have the relation in question to everything inside the class, including themselves, and nothing outside of it. For example, "having the same mother" is an equivalence relation among children. If we pick any child and consider the class of things that have the same mother as her, they will all have the same mother as each other, and none will have the same mother as anything outside of the class. On the other hand, suppose we say that *x* is *y*'s brother if *x* is a male and *x* and *y* have the same mother or the same father. Then "having the same brother" would not be an equivalence relation, because it is not transitive. It will not break a population of children up into equivalence classes. If we start with one child and consider the class of children that share a brother with that, we may have people in the class that have this relation to people outside of it.

Memory theorists often explain the notion of personal identity by starting with a relation that obtains among stages or phases of persons or their minds. Persons are then taken as being or corresponding to equivalence classes of these entities, generated by the relation given as the "criterion of identity" or, as I prefer to call it, the "unity relation. " For example, with an analysis Grice suggests, the relation is roughly "*A* and *B* are end points of a series of person-stages each member of which has an experience of which the next could have a memory" (Grice, 1941). [ii]

In this framework, Williams requirement for a logically one-one relation amounts to the following: The unity relation must be an equivalence relation not merely as a matter of fact, but as a matter of logical or metaphysical necessity. But I don't think the memory theorist needs to accept this requirement.

In the actual world, if we take a person-stage and consider the class of other states that have Grice's relation to it, the population of person stages breaks up into equivalence classes. Now suppose that in some other possible world w this is not so because there is frequent "fissioning" in the following sense: *A* person-stage *A* has an experience, which two successor person-stages *B* and C can remember. *B* and C have experiences, which

successors of theirs, B' and C' can remember. But no successor of *B* remembers any of C's experiences, and vice versa. Now if we start with C and generate the set of stages that have Grice's relation to it, *A* will be included. And if we start with B, *A* will be included. But C will not be included in B's set, and vice versa.

In world w, the notion of a person will not be as useful as it is in ours. We might say that the presuppositions of using it the way we do, to pick out individual non-branching streams of thought and experience, are not met. But the fact that this notion would not be very useful in w, does not mean it doesn't work fine in the world the way it actually is. It does not mean that this is not the notion of a person that we actually have in our world, where R is an equivalence relation.

The memory theorist can be even more flexible about the logical properties of the unity relation. Suppose that such "fissionings" of streams of experience happen in our world, but only very occasionally. The notion of a person could still be very useful, even though not applicable in a clear-cut way to those particular cases. Consider the notion of a "nation." This is a pretty useful notion, although occasionally, as in the case of Germany and Korea, a sort of fissioning takes place. When we are talking about the history of Germany or Korea, we have to be careful about the way we use the concept of the "same nation" to describe things. If streams of experience were occasionally to split, as is imagined in the reduplication case, we would have to be careful in applying the concept of "same person" to those cases. This does not show that an analysis, like Grice's, that allows the logical possibility of fission is mistaken.

So, I think it is open to the memory theorist to reply to Williams's reduplication argument by saying that it imposes a requirement on analyses of personal identity that they do not need to accept. The possibility of body transfer only requires that our notion of personal identity may be correctly analyzed in terms of a relation that is (i) as a matter of fact an equivalence relation, and (ii) is a relation that could obtain between person-stages that involve different bodies.

The memory theorist can go further, I think, and note that the analysis implied by those who reject the possibility of bodily transfer is also subject to the reduplication

argument. Williams himself notes that one could claim that "even a criterion of identity in terms of spatio-temporal continuity is itself not immune to this possibility. It is possible to imagine a man splitting, ameba-like, into two simulacra of himself" (Williams, 1970/73, p. 23). He states that there is "a vital difference between this sort of reduplication . . . and the other sorts of case." The difference is that the procedure of tracing the continuous path between two occurrences of what is taken to be a single person will inevitably reveal the duplication, if "ideally carried out." Thus, ." . . in this case, but not in the others, the logical possibility of reduplication fails to impugn the status of the criterion of identity" (Williams, 1970 p. 24). This is unconvincing for several reasons. Even if we grant that the spatio-temporal continuity requirement has the advantage described, having that advantage does not make it "logically one-one." How can such a difference between the spatio-temporal continuity criterion and others exempt it from what are alleged to be logical requirements of a criterion of identity? Perhaps the force of the "logical requirement" simply reduces to this advantage. But why should we think, after all, that this advantage is not shared by the memory criterion? Among other things, we should have to know what it is to "ideally carry out" the application of that criterion. Williams asserts that memory is a causal notion (47). As Shoemaker has observed, this seems to suggest that application of the memory criterion ideally carried out, would disclose the existence of competitors since the causal chain involved would presumably involve a spatio-temporally continuous chain of events.

I conclude that the reduplication argument does not show that memory theorists are incorrect in allowing for the possibility of body transfer. Let us now turn to what I shall call the "non-duplication argument."

3. THE NON-DUPLICATION ARGUMENT

Williams begins his discussion in "The Self and The Future" by introducing an example whose structure is that of two basic cases superimposed:

Earlier Time	Later Time
A	*A*-body person [*A*'s body, B's memories]
B	*B*-body person [B's body, *A*'s memories]

Master Case

(Superimposed Basic Cases)

Williams then poses a problem for the *A* and B. Each is asked, at the earlier time, to choose one of the bodies to be tortured at the later time, the other to receive $100,000. This choice is to be made on selfish grounds. Williams assays the results of various possible combinations of choices and seems to find in them a strong argument for describing the case as one of body transfer. For example, if *A* chose that the *B*-body person be rewarded, and this is done, then the *B*-body person will be happy about a choice he will seem to remember making. It is natural to report this as, "Someone got what he wanted," and this someone must be someone who had body *A* and then had body B. Williams's discussion from page 47 to page 50 puts the case for the possibility of body transfer about as effectively as it has been put.

But then he pulls the rug out from under us. "Let us now consider something apparently different. Someone . . . tells me that I am going to be tortured tomorrow . . . when the moment of torture comes, I shall not remember any of the things I am now in a position to remember . . . but will have a different set of impressions of my past" (p. 50). To be tortured is a frightful prospect, and the additional bits of information about loss of memory and acquisition of false belief just make things worse. But this is just a variation on the master case. Instead of adding a character, as in the reduplication argument,

character(s) are subtracted—or at least knowledge of them. We represent this variation by simply striking out half of the last diagram:

Earlier Time	**Later Time**
A	*A*-body person [*A*'s body, but not *A*'s memories]
~~B~~	~~*B* body person~~ ~~[B's body, *A*'s memories]~~

Non-duplication Case

(Top half of master case)

(With the information in the bottom half left out, the force of "B's memories" in the previous case is simply "memories that are not *A*'s"; for all *A* is to be told, the memories of the *A*-body person might not belong to anyone.) As Williams says, "For what we have just been through is of course merely one side, differently represented, of the transaction which was considered before; and it represents it as a perfectly hateful prospect, while the previous considerations represented it as something one should rationally, perhaps even cheerfully, choose out of the options there presented" (pp. 52--53).

Going back to the choice about torture and money in master case, Williams tells us that these and other considerations leave him "not in the least clear which option it would be wise to take if one were presented with them before the experiment" (p. 61). But his cautious advice is that "if we were the person *A* then, if we were to decide selfishly, we should pass the pain to the *B*-body person" (p. 63).

Williams suggests that his opponent might claim that, in terrifying *A* with his one-sided description of what is to happen, it is the omission of mention of the *B*-body person that clouds the issue. The objector would maintain that this "is to leave out exactly the feature which, as the first presentation of the case showed, makes all the difference: for it is to leave out the person who, as the first presentation showed, will be you. " [421]. Williams challenges this objector to draw a line somewhere in the following series. At which point should *A*'s fear of torture give way to anticipation of $100,000?

(i) *A* is subjected to an operation that produces total amnesia;

(ii) amnesia is produced in *A*, and other interference leads to certain changes in his character;

(iii) changes in his character are produced, and at the same time certain illusory "memory', beliefs are induced in him; these are of a quite fictitious kind....

(iv) the same as (iii) except that both the character traits and the "memory" impressions are designed to be appropriate to another actual person *B*;

(v) the same as (iv) except that the result is produced by putting the information into *A* from the brain of B, by a method that leaves *B* the same as he was before;

(vi) the same happens to *A* as in (v), but *B* is not left the same, since a similar operation is conducted in the reverse direction. (pp. 55-56).

It is case (vi) that the memory theorist seems to suppose should leave *A* looking forward to receiving $100,000. This is, it must be admitted, an odd reaction to (vi), if we take everything up to (v) as describing an increasingly troubling description of surviving as an amnesiac. But should we react to cases (i) to (v) in this way? This depends, I suggest, on what we mean by "total amnesia."

Let's return for a moment to the diagram of the master case and the non-duplication case to note a crucial point about the logic of Williams's argument. For the non-duplication argument to work, there must be a certain relation that obtains between *A* and the *A*-body person both in the master case and in the non-duplication case, which is supposed to be part of it differently presented. The relation will have to be clearly sufficient, in the non-duplication case, for the identity of *A* and the *A*-body person. Then the argument will be that the addition of body *B* and the *B*-body person to make the master case should make no difference—just as eliminating the strike-throughs in the bottom of the diagram would not alter the top. The *A*-body person would still be *A*, and not have suddenly become *B* instead.

I believe the plausibility of the non-duplication argument turns on leaving the details of the master case hazy. I shall argue that filling them in one way leaves the

argument with no force, while filling them in the other way reduces the argument to a fancy version of the reduplication argument, which I found unconvincing in the last section.

The haziness derives from the ambiguity of the term "amnesia" and the phrase "extracting information." "Amnesia" is a slippery word. It means one thing to a physician, another to a television writer, and perhaps something still different to Williams. In ordinary fiction amnesia is consistent with, and indeed implies, survival of memory traces. The picture is of a person whose memories are inaccessible, but, in some sense, still there. The disposition to remember is present, but not triggered by the ordinary conditions. photographs, diaries, and the sight of loved ones will not do the trick; perhaps a fortuitous blow on the head or electric shock therapy will. In introducing the procedure whose consequences he wishes to discuss, Williams says, "Suppose it were possible to extract information...." This is ambiguous. Compare photocopying a book to ripping its pages out. In either case, one has extracted information from the book. A possible interpretation is this: The information is extracted in a way that leaves the brain with all its memory dispositions in some way intact, although no longer capable of being triggered in the usual ways. On this interpretation, the case he envisages seems to involve a sort of programming of new memory dispositions over the old, in such a way as to leave the old dispositions no longer capable of being triggered. I'll call this the "information overlay."

A second interpretation I'll call a "brain zap." The information in the brain is extracted in the "ripping out the pages" sense. The information, the dispositions to speak, imagine, infer, and the like are destroyed. The brain is "wiped clean," to be a suitable receptacle for a completely different set of memory dispositions. Efforts to trigger the disposition would be to no avail because the disposition is not there to be triggered.

If we think of Williams's case as a information overlay, it simply leads to a complex version of reduplication argument. A plausible analysis of personal identity in terms of memory will have to be flexible enough to allow for amnesia, even amnesia together with delusions of an alternative past The identity theorist who allows for these possibilities will be confronted with two reduplication cases. Stage *A* will have the unity

relation to the *A*-body person-stage and to the *B*-body person-stage. Stage *B* will also have the unity relation to both of these stages. We have two intertwined cases where the presuppositions of the concept of person have broken down. The memory theorist should certainly not say, in this case interpreted this way, that *A* should have unalloyed feelings of joy about getting $100,000. He will have a ready explanation, in terms of the breakdown the presuppositions of the concept of a person, of our feeling of not knowing where to draw the line in the series (i) to (vi). This feeling of bafflement is just what the memory theorist could predict. *y* personal identity is analyzable in terms of a certain relation, and if Williams's case involves a double intertwined breakdown of an empirical presupposition of that concept, namely that the relation is an equivalence relation, then we have a case in which we should not expect to be able to apply our ordinary concepts.

I think there is good reason to suppose that Williams was giving "amnesia" a reading closer to what I am calling a brain zap, however. If Williams intended an information overlay, the whole point of his discussion becomes rather obscure. Let us review the logic of the situation. The interest in putative cases of body transfer is as counterexamples to the necessity of bodily identity as a condition of personal identity. If a case is presented as a counterexample, it's no good to pick another case something like it, but different in essential respects, and point out that this new case is not such a clear-cut counterexample. I think we have a right to assume that Williams's example is intended to be more or less the same sort of example that advocates of body transfer have offered. Moreover, the fact that he develops his example as a sort of moderate alternative to Shoemaker's original case, where a brain was transferred and there was no question of superimposition of one set of memory dispositions over another, and the fact that he speaks of replacing the information extracted from each brain with information extracted from the other, suggests that a brain zap is what is involved.

This suggests it might be a relevant and helpful exercise to think through the non-duplication argument as applied to Shoemaker's original case. The removal of a brain and its replacement with a different one, with no transfer of information between them, seems like just an extreme way of achieving the same effects, so far as information goes, as a

brain zap. Let's suppose, for a moment, that in the master case the *A*-body person has the actual brain *B* had at the earlier time. Then the relation between *A* at the earlier time and the *A*-body person at the later time is "having the same body but not the same brain." This will also be the relation in the nonduplication case, the variation where *B* is left out. Consider what we should tell *A* were we to fully represent to him one side of the transaction: "Tomorrow your brain will be removed from your body. Another man's brain will be put in its place. Then your body will be tortured." This certainly represents a frightening prospect. But it is far from clear that it is torture that is to be feared, rather than death and defilement. We could, of course, give a superficial description that would both be true and inspire fear of pain: "Your body is going to be whipped, and it won't be a corpse when it happens." But the fear of torture inspired by this description might be a consequence of the omission of such details as the removal of the brain. The principle, to which Williams appeals in considering his case, is that "one's fears can extend to future pain whatever psychological changes precede it" (p. 63). It's a little hard to get a grip on how this principle is supposed to work, since it seems that fear can extend to any future pain whatsoever, no matter whose it is, so long as the fearful person believes it will be his pain. The principle is surely only dubiously applicable to the Shoemaker case, for loss of one's brain is not, in the ordinary sense, a "psychological change." Williams argument, that addition of another body to the scenario in the nonduplication case cannot effect the identity of *A* and the *A*-body person, has no force unless the identity is clear to start with. If we were dealing with a brain transplant case, it would not be clear at all.

Perhaps this is all irrelevant, since Williams explicitly chooses not to deal with a case involving a physical transplant. He says, "if utterances coming from a given body are to be taken as expressive of memories . . . there should be some suitable causal link between the appropriate state of that body and the original happening" (p. 47). But one need not imagine, in order to secure this link, that a brain has actually been transplanted. "[S]uppose it were possible to extract information from a man's brain and store it in a device while his brain was repaired or even renewed, the information then being replaced: it would seem exaggerated to insist that the resultant man could not possibly have the

memories he had before the operation.... Hence we can imagine the case we are concerned with in terms of information extracted into such devices from *A*'s and B's brains and replaced in the other brain" (p. 47).

Thus the relation between *A* and the *A*-body person is not as it would be in a transplant case: having the same body but different brains. The relation is that they have the same body and the same brain, but information about *A*'s life has been extracted from this brain and other information has replaced it.

But should this make any difference, either to *A* or to the memory theorist? I cannot see that the situation is importantly changed when we deal with a brain zap rather than a brain transplant. When it's not clear that *A*'s brain will be zapped, he fears torture. When that is clear, but he is left to assume the worst about the survival of the information in his brain, he fears death, or perhaps doesn't know what to fear. When he is told that this information will be appropriately put into another brain, itself previously zapped, that might change the focus of his fear considerably.

Consider now the nonduplication case, in which *B* has been left out. What is the relation between *A* and the *A*-body person? Is it psychological change, through which *A*'s fears could, by Williams principle, appropriately extend? Or is it simply the death of *A*? Or something else? For the nonduplication argument to work, it must be psychological change. *A* would react to the description of what is to happen with fear because he regards what is to happen to his body as something like his forgetting and assimilates how he will be to a "completely amnesiac state" (p. 52).

If the relation between *A* and the *A*-body person is that the latter has the very brain the former had, but it has been zapped, then the case seems unimportantly different from a case in which they share no brain at all. A superficial description of the case might evoke fear of pain, but when the details are known, fear of death seems more appropriate. If one were tempted to draw a line between the case in which *A* and the *A*-body person do not share a brain and one in which they share a brain but it gets zapped between the earlier and later time, we could appeal to a point Williams makes. He argues that, if the sort of information-parking operation he envisages were possible, "a person could be counted the

same if this were done to him, and in the process he were given a new brain (the repairs, let us say, actually required a new part)" (80). Apparently, so long as no transfer of bodies is at issue, it is the retention of information, and not of the brain, that is crucial for survival. Why shouldn't the same be true for nonsurvival?

In considering the series (i) to (vi), the memory theorist can simply point out that, if a brain zap is involved, "amnesia" in (i) to (v) is simply a euphemism for "death." After all, it is the cessation of the sort of activity of the brain whose role is to preserve that which has here been destroyed that is known as "brain death." The use of the pronoun "him" simply begs the question at issue. In case (vi) the trauma of gaining a new body should probably be feared, offset perhaps to some extent by gaining $100,000 if one made the right choice.

If we understand that a brain zap is involved, Williams's nonduplication argument fails. The non-duplication case was supposed to remind us that *A* really was the *A*-body person. Then the argument is that *A* doesn't cease to be the *A*-body person simply because the *B*-body person is hanging around. Since, given that it involves a brain zap, the nonduplication case doesn't show that *A* is the *A*-body person, it's possible that, when the facts about *B* and the *B*-body person are added, *A* will be seen at the later time to be the *B*-body person, an unusual but unambiguous case of personal identity with transfer of bodies.

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[i] I am ignoring certain historical niceties here. In "Personal Identity and Individuation" (1957) Williams doesn't discuss why the competing survivors both (seem to) remember being Guy Fawkes, so it wasn't quite presented as a variation on what I call the basic case.

As Wiggins points out in *Identity and Spatiotemporal Continuity* (1971), we can imagine this sort of duplication even in the original case, if we suppose that

the halves of the brain are roughly equivalent in function, and imagine them being transplanted to different recipients.

The first version of the reduplication argument appears to be due to Samuel Clarke, in his controversy with Anthony Collins about the merits of Locke's approach to personal identity within the context of the issue of whether matter can think (Clarke and Collins, 1736)..

For treatments of reduplication cases, see Wiggins, 1967, Parfit, 1971, Essay 3 of this book, David Lewis, 1976, Terrence Leichti, 1975.

[ii] An exposition of Grice's views can be found in Essay 5 and in the Introduction to Perry, 1975.