



Sameness, Meaning, and Identity. by Gustav Bergmann; Individuals. by Gustav Bergmann; Concepts. by Gustav Bergmann; Herbert Hochberg

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ship, I shall not quote Leibniz. The passages I would quote are well known; most of them are in the letters of Arnauld and Clarke . . .” Bergmann then proceeds to attribute to Leibniz various views and arguments without telling the reader precisely where the supporting passages are to be found.

If this is not an essay in historical scholarship then we must assume it one in philosophical analysis. To what purpose? At the beginning of section VII, Bergmann claims that from his analysis of these various topics there is a lesson to be drawn for a contemporary issue: “For the last two hundred fifty years or so a certain kind of philosophy [the sense data philosophy] has been with us. . . . [It] is being vigorously attacked right now . . . I am nonetheless confident about its future.” This confidence rests upon the sense data philosophy’s supposed three major sources of strength: (1) It starts from what we are directly acquainted with; (2) it starts from things of which we are certain; and (3) sense data are not continuants and thus do not commit us to a view of time as absolute.

Russell’s examination of Leibniz, in this reviewer’s estimate, has little or nothing to do with such claims. Bergmann makes no case for invoking the names of Russell and Leibniz, especially in view of the author’s disclaimer of historical scholarship.

WALTER H. O'BRIANT

GUSTAV BERGMANN. *Sameness, meaning, and identity*. Ibid., pp. 132–138; also *Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia (Venezia, 12–18 settembre 1958)*, Volume quattro, *Logica, linguaggio e comunicazione*, Sansoni Editore, Florence 1960, pp. 19–27.

GUSTAV BERGMANN. *Individuals*. Ibid., pp. 124–131. (Reprinted from *Philosophical studies* (Minneapolis), vol. 9 (1958), pp. 78–85.)

GUSTAV BERGMANN and HERBERT HOCHBERG. *Concepts*. Ibid., pp. 106–114. (Reprinted from *Philosophical studies* (Minneapolis), vol. 8 (1957), pp. 19–27.)

In *Sameness, meaning, and identity*, Bergmann draws a distinction between identity and two kinds of sameness, and sketches an account of mental statements and meaning, in order to resolve the problem of the invalidity of this argument: (1) Smith knows that Venus is the Morning Star; (2) the Morning Star is the Evening Star; therefore, (3) Smith knows that Venus is the Evening Star. The exact relevance of the treatment of identity and mentality to the argument is not set out in detail.

Basic sameness is a relation between an individual or simple character and itself, not capable of further explanation. The second kind of sameness is a relation between complex characters, such as red-or-blue and not-both-not-red-and-not-blue, which can be explained in terms of “analytical equivalence.” Identity is defined by Leibniz’s formula, “Two things are identical if and only if whatever can be said of the one can be said *salva veritate* of the other.”

The account of mental statements takes as basic schema, “The thought . . . means” This schema yields analytic truths when tokens of a single sentence type are inserted in both gaps; other insertions yield contradictions. Instances of the schema are *M*-contexts. An ideal language requires *M*-contexts, one adequate to describe only the world’s material aspects does not.

This means, says Bergmann, that in the ideal language identity and sameness do not coincide. To apply his views to the example “The Morning Star is the same as the Evening Star” will be true, but “The Morning Star is identical with the Evening Star” will not be, since substitution of “the Morning Star” for “the Evening Star” in *M*-contexts does not preserve truth.

It appears that Bergmann’s treatment of identity is intended to be relevant to the problem in the following way. Premiss (2) is ambiguous. If sameness is involved, the premiss is true, but the inference to (3) is not licensed by Leibniz’s formula. If identity is involved, the inference is valid, but the premiss false.

But Leibniz’s formula is ambiguous, and Bergmann’s definition of identity inherits the ambiguity. So defined, identity might be a relation between things which satisfy the same open sentences, or a relation between expressions which yield true sentences when inserted into the same open sentences. Bergmann’s directions for interpreting *M*-contexts make it impossible to consider “The thought Venus is the Morning Star means Venus is the Morning Star” as having as its truth-condition that the Morning Star satisfy the open sentence “The thought Venus is the Morning Star means Venus is_____.” Since he regards the disparity in truth-value

between the sentence just mentioned and "The thought Venus is the Morning Star means Venus is the Evening Star" as showing that the Morning Star is not identical with the Evening Star, it seems clear that identity is intended to be a relation between expressions. Bergmann says identity is a relation, "as it were, between expressions."

This means that the distinction between sameness and identity does not contribute to Bergmann's solution to the problem. This distinction is merely crystallization in unhelpful terminology of the ambiguity in Leibniz's formula. With regard to the suggested ambiguity in (2), the question is not whether sameness or identity is asserted, but whether sameness is asserted of planets or expressions.

The problem with the argument emerges when we take (2) to be about planets and the inference to (3) to be licensed by Leibniz's formula, interpreted in the most natural way, as concerning things which satisfy the same open sentences. Bergmann's theory of mentality, when applied to premiss (1), then seems to contain the whole of his solution. In the transcription of (1) into Bergmann's ideal language, the expression "the Morning Star" would appear only within *M*-contexts. So (1) should not be seen as having as its truth-condition that the Morning Star satisfy some open sentence, which, by (2) and the relevant interpretation of Leibniz's formula, the Evening Star can also be inferred to satisfy. This solution to the problem is as plausible as the theory of mental statements on which it rests. Criticism of that theory, which is not set out or defended in detail in this paper, is beyond the scope of this review.

In *Individuals* Bergmann considers three explications of individual: as what can be referred to by a zero-level constant of the ideal language, as what can be referred to by the constants one level below the predicates for *being earlier than* and *being simultaneous with*, and those things which are not identical with other things. In the third explication, "identity" is used in the way explained in *Sameness, meaning, and identity*, but the language under consideration does not contain *M*-contexts.

In *Concepts*, the authors identify a concept f_1 as *the propositional character which means that* $(\exists f)(f = f_1)$. The italicized description is formed from an *M*-context in the sense explained in *Sameness, meaning, and identity*. The account of meaning sketched in that paper is given a more detailed explanation here.

JOHN PERRY

GUSTAV BERGMANN. *Intentionality*. A reprint of XXIV 213. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–38.

GUSTAV BERGMANN. *The revolt against logical atomism*. *Ibid.*, pp. 39–72. (Reprinted from *The philosophical quarterly*, vol. 7 (1957), pp. 323–339, and vol. 8 (1958), pp. 1–14.)

GUSTAV BERGMANN. *Analyticity*. *Ibid.*, pp. 73–90. (Reprinted from *Theoria* (Lund), vol. 24 (1958), pp. 71–93.)

GUSTAV BERGMANN. *Elementarism*. *Ibid.*, pp. 115–123. (Reprinted from *Philosophy and phenomenological research*, vol. 18 (1957), pp. 107–114.)

GUSTAV BERGMANN. *Professor Quine on analyticity*. A reprint of XXIII 68. *Ibid.*, pp. 139–143.

GUSTAV BERGMANN. *Some remarks on the ontology of Ockham*. *Ibid.*, pp. 144–154. (Reprinted from *The philosophical review*, vol. 63 (1954), pp. 560–571.)

GUSTAV BERGMANN. *Some reflections on time*. *Ibid.*, pp. 225–263. (Reprinted from *II tempo*, Archivio di filosofia, Padua 1958, pp. 49–82.)

JAMES F. HARRIS, JR., and RICHARD SEVERENS. *Introduction. Analyticity*, edited with an introduction by James F. Harris, Jr., and Richard H. Severens, Quadrangle Books, Chicago 1970, pp. 3–22.

JAMES F. HARRIS, JR., and RICHARD SEVERENS. Summary. *Ibid.*, pp. 23–27.

W. V. QUINE. *Two dogmas of empiricism*. A reprint of XVII 281. *Ibid.*, pp. 27–53.