The point I am making, of course, only restates the earlier point about the "unrealism" of our model. To reformulate the theory to make it more "realistic," we need to consider conditionals whose antecedents describe, not patterns of preference orderings, but patterns of utility assignments by the members of G. Two problems confront this move, however. First, there are infinitely many patterns of possible utility assignments to consider; so the treatment of these would require a different apparatus from the one we have been using. Secondly, it remains to be explained exactly what the relationship is between degrees of power and the ability to obtain a given outcome with higher or lower assignments of utility (degrees of intensity). In "Toward a Theory of Social Power" I have dealt with this problem for the case of two persons and two-outcome issues.[15] There is reason to believe that the same general approach might be applied to many persons and many-outcome issues. Nonetheless, serious complications would be involved in extending this approach to many persons and many-outcome issues. In any case, this task is beyond the scope of the present paper.

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BOOK REVIEWS

On Universals: An Essay in Ontology. NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF. Chicago: The University Press, 1970. xiv, 305 pp.

Wolterstorff takes a stand on a great many issues in this long book, but I found no single unifying theme, no central message apt for summary. In lieu of this I offer a list of his more important conclusions: there are universals, universals cannot be identified with classes of their exemplifications (Socrates *exemplifies* baldness); nor with classes of their cases (Socrates's baldness is *a case of* baldness); talk of universals is dispensable, but this shows nothing of significance about their ontological status; universals do not enter into human life as *agents*; universals are the objects of *abstractive attention* (as when I notice the color of a colored thing); universals do enter into human life through "such activities as predication, perception, thought, and the like" (7); universals are not paradigms, nor ideas in God's mind, nor exemplars; what all universals have in common is that they are *kinds*.

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[15] See sec. IV, "Cost and Degrees of Power."

Wolterstorff argues ably for each of these positions (and many more). Typically, he adopts a positive position because alternatives are found wanting and arguments against it defective. He is a good critic, fair and thorough, if not always sympathetic. But his method has its limits: the reader often feels he has learned more about what Wolterstorff doesn't believe than about what he does. A case in point is the treatment in chapter VI of the phenomenon of abstractive attention. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to a careful discussion of the theory that cases of universals, and not universals themselves, are the objects of abstractive attention. Wolterstorff first tries to make this view worth consideration by dispelling, with surprising effectiveness, doubts we might have about there being such things as cases of universals. He then argues that, even if there are cases, they are not the objects of all instances of abstractive attention. The views of Aquinas and Geach on such matters are searchingly criticized. But in the end, although one has been told a great deal about what abstractive attention is not, one has not been told much about what it is. One is not told how universals play their role in this phenomenon, the implications of the phenomenon for theories of perception, the relation of abstractive attention to a priori or noninductive knowledge of relations between universals, or, finally, how the treatment of abstractive attention squares with Wolterstorff's view that universals are not agents. Are there causal roles of a non-agency type for universals to fill? Or does their role in abstractive attention not require any sort of causal efficiency on their part?

The collection of positions Wolterstorff takes do not add up to a "theory" of universals. He does not offer us anything approaching a formal theory, analogous to the theory of sets, but that's hardly a major complaint. But we might well have been told more than we are about the general conditions under which a given universal *is* (we are not to say, "exists"), and under which universals are identical. Wolterstorff advocates the "general predicate entailment principle," which is "Necessarily, if x if f, then there is such a thing as f-ity" (114). This seems to suggest that there is a universal corresponding to any open sentence, which bears some nonsymmetric relation (such as *being a property of*) to all the things of which the open sentence is true. Such a principle would lead to Russell's property of all properties that are not properties of themselves, and the attendant difficulties about whether or not this property is a property of itself. Wolterstorff says later (164) that

there is no such property; so the suggested principle does not adequately represent his views, but it's the closest we are given.

Even if we can't take the predicate-entailment principle too seriously, its suggestion of a willingness to countenance lots of universals does reflect Wolterstorff's thinking. It guarantees a universal corresponding to any class whose members can be listed, and Wolterstorff seems to accept this. He allows (122) that there is such a thing as *being alpha,* where alpha is introduced by some definition like 'The star Sirius, my fountain-pen, the Parthenon, the color red, the number five, and the letter z are alphas, and nothing else.' But one of the points of believing in universals is that there are "fewer" universals than classes; so the universals remaining have some explanatory value. That there is greenness but not alphaness to be recognized, abstractively attended to, projected, and so forth *might* help explain why we find simple predicates in human languages for things that are green, but not for things that are alpha. If universals don't have this explanatory value, what are they for? Wolterstorff describes his views as "something of a rapprochement between classical realism and classical nominalism" (6). I am inclined more to call it an uneasy compromise. We have all the universals the realist wants and more, but they explain just what the nominalist thinks they explain: nothing.

On the matter of identity conditions for universals, Wolterstorff has little helpful to say. He says that "a condition for the identity of properties is that it is impossible that something should have one and lack the other; and a condition of the identity of actions is that it is impossible that one should be what some thing is doing and the other not be what that thing is doing" (152). Taken one way this condition is substantial but false; taken another way, it is true but trivial. What is wanted is a criterion that does not follow from the general principle of identity, the indiscernibility of the identical: if A is $B,$ then A has every property B has (which is not to be confused with the semantical principle often referred to as "Leibniz's Law," that if 'A' and 'B' name the same thing, substitution of 'A' for 'B' preserves truth value). This is true, for example, of the criterion that a class is determined by its members. All that the principle of the indiscernibility of the identical would tell us is that classes that are identical do have, did have, would have, and will have the same members. It does not guarantee that a class at one time or in one circumstance, will have the same members as it will have at any other time in any other circumstance. Since this does not follow from the general principle of identity, the

criterion of identity for classes tells us something special and interesting about classes—something that distinguishes them from *kinds,* for example, which can have different members at different times or under different circumstances (as Wolterstorff points out). If we take Wolterstorff to mean,

> If A and B are the same property, then 'if x has A, x has B' is necessarily true.

he would be offering such a substantive principle, not entailed by the general principle of identity. But this condition is false, as Wolterstorff himself later points out (157). For example, blue is the color of the sky, but 'if my tie is the color of the sky, my tie is blue' is not necessarily true. So presumably Wolterstorff's condition comes to this:

> Necessarily, if A and B are the same property, then, if x has A, x has B.

This is true, but it is simply an instance of the indiscernibility of the identical, and does not serve to distinguish properties from toads.

Although he offers us no theory of universals, formal or otherwise, Wolterstorff's contribution could be characterized as a prolegomenon to any such theory; he offers examples, arguments, and distinctions that any future theorist will profit by and have to account for.

Wolterstorff's main positive and original thesis about universals is that they are one and all *kinds.* This is an answer to the question: what do predicable universals and substance universals have in common? The positive answer is again preceded by a long discussion of the leading alternative, that universals are distinguished by the way they "fit" into space and time. Wolterstorff's elegant discussion of such views is one of the best parts of his book. He carefully distinguishes different spatiotemporal properties that universals might be thought to have and everything else lack. The most plausible is *being capable of discontinuous multiple position in time.* An entity has multiple position in time if it is wholly at more than one time. Thus persons and material objects have multiple position in time (even though I was only there for a moment, I saw *all of* Willy Mays), whereas processes do not (I was only there for a moment, so I didn't see *all of* the game). Wolterstorff argues that this condition is both too strong and too weak. Too weak because it's not so clear that persons and material objects aren't *capable of* multiple discontinuous position in time, even though we expect them to be continuous. Too strong because some

universals, such as *being an animal if a cat,* and *being a predicable,* will not qualify. I'm unconvinced the suggestion is beyond repair. For example, to take care of the latter objection, might we define as *basic universals* entities that are capable of multiple discontinuous position in time, and, as *universals,* basic universals plus entities, such as *being an animal if a cat,* obtained from basic universals by certain modes of composition?

Wolterstorff's own position, that universals are all *kinds,* is implausible. We certainly would not ordinarily call "kinds" all of the things Wolterstorff takes to be universals, for example, *being an animal if a cat,* or *being an alpha.* The general term 'alpha' is strange simply because it does not stand for a kind of object. So if all universals are kinds, they are kinds in an extended and technical sense. But what extended sense will serve to rule out non-universals? The formal core of the notion of a kind seems to amount to this. We have a set of objects, all with some or other nonsymmetrical relation to another, their kind. (The relation varies; the performances of a symphony bear the relation *performance of* to the symphony, books are *copies of* book-types, etc.) Some of the truths about the kinds seem to be "borrowed" from truths about the things bearing this relation to it (*Gulliver's Travels* is long because copies of it are long); others are not (*Gulliver's Travels* has many editions, but none of its copies has many editions). And kinds are not classes, for one and the same kind may have, at different times or under different conditions, different "members" than it does have. (These points are all made by Wolterstorff.) But, given this generalization of the notion of a kind, are not such non-universals as persons and material objects kinds? Smith has the nonsymmetrical relation *has as a stage* to the person-stages that compose him; some of the truths about Smith are "borrowed" from truths about his person-stages (e.g., that Smith was smoking on July third), others are not (Smith is ninety years old, but none of his person-stages have reached that age). Smith cannot be identified with the class of his stages for the same reasons that universals cannot be identified with classes of their cases, and so forth. It's not open to Wolterstorff to argue that person-stages are inadmissible, not being included in our conceptual scheme; for he is trying to describe not our conceptual scheme, but reality itself (xiii). We don't actually call Smith a kind of person-stage. But we don't actually call *Gulliver's Travels* the kind, Copy of *Gulliver's Travels,* either.

On balance, Wolterstorff's book contains much of value: good criticisms, interesting examples, useful distinctions, plausible sug-

gestions, some convincing arguments, others merely ingenious. I had hoped for more illumination, but that may have been due to unrealistic assumptions on my part.

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