THE SAME *F*

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In several places Peter Geach has put forward the view that "it makes no sense to judge whether x and y are `the same' . . . unless we add or understand some general term---the same F (Geach, 1962, p. 39)." In this paper I discuss just what Geach's view comes to; I argue that there are no convincing reasons for adopting it and quite strong reasons for rejecting it.

I agree with criticisms of Geach made by David Wiggins in his recent book, *Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity* (1967), some of which are repeated here. I hope, however, to shed more light than he has on the motivations for Geach's view, and to state somewhat more systematically an opposing one. This is possible in part because of an article by Geach on this topic which has appeared since Wiggins' book (Geach, 1969a).

1. GEACH VERSUS FREGE

Geach generally develops his view of identity in conscious opposition to Frege; he emphasizes that his view is the result of noticing an important fact that he thinks Frege missed:

> I am arguing for the thesis that identity is relative. When one says "*x* is identical with y" this, I hold, is an incomplete expression; it is short for "*x* is the same *A* as *y*" where "*A*" represents some count noun understood from the context of utterance---or else, it is just a vague expression of some half-formed thought. Frege emphasized that "*x* is one" is an incomplete way of saying "*x* is one *A*, a single *A*," or else has no clear sense; since the connections of the concepts one and identity comes out just as much in the German "ein und dasselbe" as in the English "one and the same," it has always surprised me that Frege

> did not similarly maintain the parallel doctrine of relativized identity, which I have just briefly stated (Geach, 1969, p. 3).
>
> I maintain it makes no sense to judge whether *x* and *y* are "the same" or whether *x* remains "the same" unless we add or understand some general term---the same *F*. That in accordance with which we thus judge as to the identity, I call a criterion of identity; . . . Frege sees clearly that "one" cannot significantly stand as a predicate of objects unless it is (at least understood as) attached to a general term; I am surprised he did not see that this holds for the closely allied expression "the same"(Geach, 1962, p. 39).
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> Frege has clearly explained that the predication of "one endowed with wisdom" . . . does not split up into predications of "one" and "endowed with wisdom." . . . It is surprising that Frege should on the contrary have constantly assumed that "*x* is the same *A* as *y*" does split up into "*x* is an *A* (and *y* is an *A*)" and "*x* is the same . . .*y*" We have already by implication rejected this analysis. . .(Geach, 1962, p. 151-52).

We can best see what Geach's view of identity amounts to, and what considerations might weigh in favor of it, by seeing just how he disagrees with Frege. What does Geach mean by denying that, for example, "being the same horse as" "splits up" into "being the same as" and "being a horse?" We can better understand the disagreement if we first list the points on which Frege and Geach might agree.

First, I think that Frege could agree with Geach that an utterance of the grammatical from "*x* and *y* are the same" might not have a clear truth value, and that this situation might be remedied by adding a general term after the word "same."[1] For instance, the utterance "What I bathed in yesterday and what I bathed in today are the same" might not have a clear truth value in a certain situation, although "What I bathed in yesterday and what I bathed in today are the same river" or "What I bathed in yesterday and what I bathed in today are the same water" do have clear truth values. And Frege would further agree, I believe, that the truth values of the last two statements might differ: it might be true that I bathed in the same river on both days, but false that I bathed in the same water.

Second, I think Frege could agree that in adding the general term after the word "same," one could be said to convey a criterion of identity, and that the original utterance is deficient in that no criterion of identity is conveyed.

And, finally, I think Frege might agree with reservations in saying that, in supplying a general term and conveying a criterion of identity, one is making clear which relation is asserted to hold between the referents of the statement. Frege must admit that the truth values "*x* and *y* are the same F" and *x* and *y* are the same G" may differ. For instance, "Cassius Clay and Muhammed Ali are the same man" is true, but "Cassius Clay and Muhammed Ali are the same number" is not true. This shows that "being the same as" and "being the same number as" are not extensionally equivalent, and therefore do not express the same relation. But, having admitted this, Frege might add that, in an important sense, one relation is asserted in both cases. And this is where Frege and Geach disagree. To see how the relations might be said to be the same in each statement after all, let us compare a case Frege might regard as analogous.

Consider "being a left-handed brother of" and "being a red-haired brother of." These quite obviously express different relations, for they are not extensionally equivalent. But these relations differ in a way that leaves them intimately connected. "Being a left-handed brother of" clearly splits up into "being a brother of" and "being left-handed." To say that Jim is a left-handed brother of Mike is to say no more or less than that Jim is a brother of Mike and Jim is left-handed. And the same thing is true of "being a red-haired brother of." The two relations involved do not differ, we might say, in being two different kinds of brotherhood, left-handed and red-haired. The job of the words "red-haired" and "left-handed" is not to tell us what kind of brotherhood is being asserted. Rather, they assert something about the first referent in addition to the relation asserted. In such a case, it is very natural to say that the relations are in a sense the same, for the words "left-handed brother of" and "red-haired brother of" express a conjunction of two conditions, only one of which is relational. And that condition which is relational is the same in both cases---namely, being a brother

of. One important consequence of this is that it follows from "*x* is a left-handed brother of *y*" and "*x* is red-haired" that "*x* is a red-haired brother of *y*." We can express this by saying that "is a red-haired brother of" and "is a left-handed brother of" express restrictions of the relation "being a brother of" to respectively, the domains of the left-handed and the red-haired.

Now compare with this the difference between the relations expressed by "being a better golfer than," and "being a better swimmer than." These are different relations. But they do not differ in the way those just examined differ. "Being a better golfer than" does not break up into "being better than" and "being a golfer." There is no such thing as just being better than. This is the reason that it does not follow from "*x* is a better golfer than *y*" and "*x* is a swimmer" that "*x* is a better swimmer than *y*."

Frege's position is that "being the same *F* as," like "being a red-haired brother of," splits up into a general relation and an assertion about the referent; it breaks up into "being the same as" and "being an *F*."[2] This is what Geach denies. He thinks that "being the same *F* as," like "being a better golfer than," does not split up. Just as there is not such thing as being just "better than," Geach says that "there is no such thing as being just `the same'....(Geach, 1957, p. 69)."

This then is the difference of opinion between Frege and Geach. Geach's succinct statement of his view is: "it makes no sense to judge whether *x* and *y* are `the same' . . . unless we add or understand some general term---the same *F*." But this disguises the real nature of the dispute. Frege would not deny, and I will not deny, that in significant judgments of identity a general term that conveys a criterion of identity will be implicitly or explicitly available. I shall not try to refute Geach by producing a case of being the same that is not a case of being the same *F* for some general term "*F*." That is not the issue. The issue is the role of the general term and the criterion of identity that it conveys.

The view I advocate, and which I believe to be Frege's, is that the role of the general term is to identify the referents--not to identify the "kind of identity" asserted. According to this view *x* and *y* cannot be the same *F*, but different *G*'s if

x and *y* are the same *F*, then the relation of identity obtains between *x* and *y*, and any statement that denies this is false. In particular, no denial of identity of the form *"x* and *y* are different *G's* can be true. Frege cannot allow the possibility that *x* and *y* are the same *F* but different *G's*.[3] But, on Geach's view, there is no objection to such a case. On his view, just as it does not follow that Jones is a better golfer than Smith from the fact that he is a better swimmer than Smith and is a golfer, so too it does not follow that *x* is the same *G* as *y* from the fact that *x* is the same *F* as *y* and is a *G* Thus Geach says,

> On my own view of identity I could not object in principle to different *A*'s being one and the same *B* . . . as different official personages may be one and the same man.(Geach, 1962, p. 157)

If we can find an example in which *x* and *y* are the same *F* but *x* and *y* are different *G's* we shall have to admit Geach is right in rejecting Frege's view, just as if there were cases of people who are left-handed and brothers but not left-handed brothers, we should have to give up the view that "being a left-handed brother" splits up into "being left-handed" and "being a brother."

Before considering some examples that seem to be of this form, I would like to point out an interesting consequence of Geach's view. Geach's view differs from Frege's in allowing the possibility of true statement of the form "*x* and *y* are the same *F* but *x* and *y* are different *G's*." But if we can find a counterexample of this form, we shall have to give up more than Frege's view. We shall have to give up some principles about identity that seem very plausible.

If we are going to view a statement of the form "*x* is the same *F* as y" as asserting some relation expressed by "is the same *F* as " of the referents of "*x*" and "*y*," then this relation should behave, on Frege's view, as a restriction of the general relation of identity to a specific kind of objects. As such, it should share some of the properties ordinarily attributed to identity: transitivity, symmetry, and substitutivity. Reflexivity is lost: every object need not be the same *F* as itself, for all objects are not *F*'s. But these relations should be at least weakly reflective: any object that is the same *F* as some object must be the same *F* as itself. But any

counterexample to Frege will also be a counterexample to some of these principles. Consider any such counterexample. It is in the form of a conjunction. The second conjunct says that *x* and *y* are different *G*'s. If we make the substitution in this conjunct that the first conjunct licenses us to make, the result is "*x* and *x* are different *G*'s." To accept this result is to deny that the relation expressed by "the same *G*" is even weakly reflexive, which requires either that such relations are not transitive or not symmetrical. To deny the substitution is to deny that these relations confer substitutivity. If we accept Geach's view, we shall have to abandon some traditional and rather plausible logical doctrines.

2. *A COUNTEREXAMPLE?*

In "Identity," a recent article from which some of the earlier quotations were drawn, Geach has explained his views at greater length than before. At first glance, the views expressed in that article may seem difficult to reconcile with those I have just attributed to him; it is a difficult article. Although Geach says that "at first sight" his own view seems to conflict with "classical identity theory"-- the view that identity is a reflexive relation that confers substitutivity-- he never points out in so many words that it will have to be abandoned if his theory of identity is correct. Nevertheless, the view Geach expounds does turn out to be, when carefully examined, just the view I have attributed to him, and does have the consequences I said it had.

Geach's view is best understood, I think, by looking first at his examples, and then considering the rather involved argument and doctrine those examples are supposed to illustrate. These examples, as interpreted by Geach, are of just the sort we found required to refute Frege's view.

Consider the following list of words:

A. Bull

B. Bull

C. Cow

How many words are on the list? It has often been pointed out that such a question is ambiguous; the right answer might be "two" or it might be "three." One explanation of this ambiguity is that the answer depends on what kind of object we are counting, word types or word tokens; there are three word tokens, but only two word types on the list. But this is not the way Geach looks at the matter. According to him, there are not two kinds of objects to be counted, but two different ways of counting the same objects. And the reason there are two ways of counting the objects is that there are two different "criteria of relative identity." The number of words on the list depends on whether *A* and *B* are counted as one and the same word; they are counted the same according to the criteria of relative identity expressed by "word type," but not according to the one expressed by "word token." Geach's claim is then that the conjunction

(1) *A* is the same word type as B, but *A* and *B* are different word tokens.

is true. And this conjunction seems to be just the sort of counterexample required to prove Frege wrong.

The rather involved and difficult doctrine that precedes such alleged counterexamples as this in Geach's article seems to me best viewed as an attempt to undermine some distinctions implicit in fairly obvious objections to such an example. I will now state those objections, and in the next section explain how Geach seeks to undermine them.

First, in order to be of the form *"x* and *y* are the same *F*, but *x* and *y* are different *G*'s" the referring expressions in the example that correspond to "*x*" and "*y*" will have to refer to the same objects in the first and second conjuncts. The sameness of expression is not sufficient. If it were, the true statement "John Adams was the father of John Adams" would be of the form "*x* was the father of *x*" and a counterexample to a principle of genealogy. It seems a plausible criticism of Geach's proposed counterexample that it fails for just this reason; in the first conjunct of (1) "*A*" and *"B"* refer to word types, in the second to word

tokens. Indeed, the role of the general terms "word token" and "word type" is just to tell us what objects--the types or the tokens--those expressions do refer to.

One might reply to this objection by saying that the fact expressed by (1) could as well have been expressed by

(2) *A* and *B* are different word tokens, but the same word type.

In (2) the expressions "*A*" and "*B*" appear only once; it might be claimed that it becomes very dubious, in virtue of this single appearance, to claim that four references to three referents take place within (2).

But there is a second criticism. Even if the occurrences of "*A*" and *"B"* are interpreted as referring to the same objects in both conjuncts of (1), or as not being multiply referential in (2), it is still far from clear that either (1) or (2) is a good counterexample. There is a further requirement. It is not sufficient, for a statement to be what Frege, or most other philosophers, would call an identity statement, that it contain the word "same," or be of the verbal form *"x* and *y* are the same *F*." For example, "Sarah and Jimmy are members of the same family" it is not an identity statement; no one would suppose its truth required that everything true of Sarah be true of Jimmy. Nor are "The couch and the chair are the same color" or "Tommy is the same age as Jimmy" identity statements. These statements are of course closely related to identity statements; the first two, for example are equivalent to "The family of Jimmy is identical with the family of Sarah" and "The color of the couch is identical with the color to the chair." But as they are, they are not identity statements: the relation of identity is not asserted to obtain between the subjects of the statements--Jimmy and Sarah, the couch and the chair. Yet it is clearly a further requirement of a counterexample to Frege that both conjuncts be identity statements in the relevant sense. That is, the conjunct that says "*x* and *y* are the same F's" must be an assertion of identity, and the conjunct that says*"x* and *y* are different *G*'s" must be a denial of identity. For example, no one should suppose that "The couch and the chair are the same color, but different pieces of furniture" would be a good counterexample to Frege.

It seems clear to me that if we assume that "*A*" and *"B"* refer to word tokens throughout (1), then the first conjunct of (1) is not an assertion of identity, but merely an assertion that *A* and *B* are similar in a certain respect, or have some property in common; they are both tokens of the same type, they have the same shape, they are "equiform." Note that this conjunct could be more naturally expressed "*A* and *B* are of the same type" or "*A* and *B* are tokens of the same type." In this way the conjunct resembles the statement "The couch and the chair are the same color" which could more naturally be put "The couch and the chair have the same color" or "The couch and the chair are of the same color." But identity statements are not more naturally expressed in such ways; we feel no temptation to say that Lyndon Johnson and LBJ are of the same man, or have the same man.

Thus Geach's counterexample seems open to the following objections. If "*A*" and *"B"* refer to the same objects throughout (1), the first conjunct of (1) is not an identity statement, and the counterexample fails. If both conjuncts are identity statements in the required sense, "*A*" and *"B"* must refer to word types in the first conjunct and word tokens in the second, and the counterexample fails.

3. Must We Ever Choose Identity?

We find in "Identity" a rather abstract line of arguments which, if correct, will show the criticism I have just made of Geach's counterexample to be based on untenable or at least unnecessary notions: the notion of word types as a kind of object different from word tokens and the notion of a statement of identity ("absolute" identity) as opposed to a resemblance or common property statement ("relative" identity). The only distinction needed, according to Geach, is between different kinds of "relative" identity:[4] being-the-same-word-type and being-the-same-word-token.

To understand Geach's argument, we must first notice a rather interesting point. A great many propositions are about particular things. For instance, the proposition "The pen I am writing with is blue" is about a particular object--the pen in my hand--which is referred to by the subject term. An assertion of the

proposition can be looked upon as asserting of that pen that it has a certain property--being blue--which is expressed by the predicate. Now part of understanding an utterance that expresses such a proposition is understanding under what conditions the proposition expressed would be true. The interesting point to which I wish to call attention is just that this element in, or requirement of understanding the utterance, does not generally require knowing which object the subject term of the proposition refers to, and exactly what the predicate asserts of it.

A simple example will establish this. Consider the sentence "Pa" in the language L. I inform you that the utterance "*Pa*" is true if and only if the word in the box stands for a much misunderstood notion.

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You understand the English; you now know the truth conditions of "*Pa*" But my explanation has not determined the referent of *"a"* or the condition expressed by "*P*---." Even if we take the English sentence:

The word in the box stands for a much misunderstood notion.

as a translation of "*P*a," nothing has been said about which parts of the English sentence correspond to which parts of "*Pa*." Different translations of the elements seem equally allowable:

a: the word in the box

*P*__: __stands for a much misunderstood notion

a: the box

*P*__: the word in __ stands for a much misunderstood notion

It is possible, in certain easily imagined cases, to know the truth conditions of a great many sentences of some such language, without being clear about the

proper interpretations of their parts. Suppose "*Pa*" is true if and only if the type of which the word in the box is a token is often misspelled. On the basis of this information, two interpretations of "*P*__" and *"a"* seem allowable:

a: the type of which the word in the box is a token.

*P*__: __is often misspelled.

a: the word in the box.

*P*__: is a token of a type that is often misspelled

We might be told the truth conditions of a great many sentences containing "*P*__" and *"a"* and still be in the dark as to their proper interpretation. For example we might be told that "*Fa*" is true if and only if the type of the token in the box is often capitalized; that "*Pc*" is true if and only if the first word on the author's copy of this page is often misspelled, and so forth. This additional information about further sentences would not resolve the problem of interpretation.

The relation between the referring expressions, "the token in the box" and "the type of the token in the box," is that the latter refers to an object which is identified by means of a reference to the object identified by the former. Thus, "the type of the token in the circle" identifies the same type as "the type of the token in the box"--although the tokens are different.

Suppose we were told that "*Pb*" were true if and only if the type of the token in the circle were often misspelled. Then, clearly, "*Pb*" is equivalent to "*Pa*" But is *a* identical with *b*? This is just the question of the proper interpretation. If "*P*__" means "__is often misspelled," then *"a"* and *"b"* refer to the same word type. If

"*P*__" means "--is a token of a type that is often misspelled" then *"a"* and *"b"* refer to different word tokens (of the same type).

To show that *a* is not identical with *b*, it would be necessary only to establish that *a* has some property *b* lacks; if *a* and *b* are identical they must share their properties. Suppose there is some predicate "*S*__" in *L* such that "*Sa*" has a different truth value than "*Sb*." Clearly, we could conclude that *a* is not identical with *b*; that *a* and *b* are different tokens, not one and the same type.

Suppose we are told that "*R(a,b)*" is true if only and only if the token in the circle and the token in the box are tokens of the same type.

a: the type of the token in the box.

b: the type of the token in the circle.

R(__,__): __ and __ are identical

a: the token in the box.

b: the token in the circle.

R(__,__): __ and __ are equiform.

Which should we choose? Well if we choose the first interpretation, then everything true of *A* will have to be true of *B*. so if there is some predicate "*S*__" in *L*, such that the truth values of "*S(a)*" and "*S(b)*" are different, the second interpretation would have to be chosen. If not, it would seem that we were free to choose the first.

Suppose, however, there are no such predicates. Would that fact be sufficient justification for interpreting "*R*(__,__)*"* as "is identical with"? in a sense, it would not force us to do so. Even if there were no predicate like "*S*__" in *L*, it still might be that "*R*(__,__)*"* did not mean identity. It might be just accidental that there are no such predicates; perhaps the speakers of *L* have not yet noticed

any properties that distinguish word tokens, or think them unworthy of expression in their language.

To have the formal properties required to express identity, an expression "*R*(__,__)" in *L* need satisfy only the following two conditions:[5] (i) for any referring expression *a* in L, "*Ra,a*" is true; (ii) for any referring expressions *a* and *b*, and any predicate ϕ in *L*, if "*Ra,b*" is true, "ϕa" and "ϕb" are materially equivalent. The force of the last paragraph is that these necessary conditions for expressing identity are not logically sufficient. "*R*(__,__)" might satisfy these conditions and not express identity---but just the kind of similarity (or relative identity) appropriate to the objects in the domain of *L*.

Now let us make a rough distinction between an object of a kind *K* and an occurrence of a kind *K*. An occurrence of a kind *K* is an object which, although is not itself a *K*, is the sort of object, or one sort of object, which would ordinarily be employed in ostensively identifying a *K*. For example, a word token is an occurrence of a word type, because we ostensively identify word types by pointing to a word token and saying "the type of which that is a token" or even "that type." Surfaces or physical objects are occurrences of colors, because we ostensively identify colors by pointing at surfaces and saying "the color of that "or "that color."

Our choice in interpreting "*R(a,b)*" is just this: to interpret "*a*" and "*b*" as references to word types and "*R*(__,__)" as "is identical with," or to interpret "*a*" and "*b*" as reference to occurrences of word types (which is to say, as references to word tokens), and "*R*(__,__)" as expressing one kind of what Geach calls "relative identity"---namely, "is equiform with."

Geach's argument, as I understand it, is this. We might very well have a reason to choose the second interpretation--for example, that there is in *L* a predicate "*S*__" such that "*Sa & ~Sb*" is true. Moreover, even if we do not have such a predicate in *L*, we might choose to add one in the future, and should not close this option ("limit our ideology"). But no circumstances are conceivable in which we are forced to choose the first interpretation. We are always

theoretically free to take the second. Moreover, there is a general reason for not choosing the first: in doing so we multiply the entities to which we allow references (types now as well as tokens) and thereby "pollulate our ontology."[6] But then there is never any reason to interpret a predicate in *L* as expressing identity, rather than some form of relative identity, and never any good reason to interpret the references in *L* to be to things which have occurrences, rather than to occurrences themselves. But then are not the very notions of identity, and of a reference to such an object, suspect? And if this is so, are we not justified in waiving the criticisms made of the counterexample to Frege in Section II, since those criticisms are completely based on these notions?

4 In Defense of Identity

The charges that the interpretation of "*R(__,__)*" as "is identical with" would restrict ideology while polluting the universe are completely unfounded.

Consider the language *L+* which contains all of the sentences of *L*, plus sentences composed of the predicate "*K(__,__)*" and the referring expressions of *L*. The sentences of *L+* which are also sentences of *L* have the same truth conditions in *L+* as in *L*. "*K(a,b)*" is true if and only if the word token on page 9 is more legible than the word token on page 11. Then clearly, "*R(__,__)*" does not express identity in *L*. "*R(a,b)*" is true, but "*K(a,b)*" and "*K(a,a)*" are not materially equivalent or so we shall suppose.

Now all of this does not in the least show that "*R(__,__)*" does not express identity in *L*. The facts that "*R(__,__)*" does not express identity in *L+* and that the symbols used in *L* and *L+* are largely the same, and that the truth conditions of the shared sentences are the same in each, do not entail that the shared expressions have the same interpretation.

If, however, we think of *L* and *L+* as successive states of the same language, actually employed by humans, then the evidence that "*R(__,__)*" does not confer substitutivity in *L+* is grounds for thinking it is only an accident that it did in *L*---the earlier state; perhaps no one had conceptualized the relation being

more legible than, or any other property capable of distinguishing tokens. This seems to be Geach's view: as our language grows, what now has the formal properties ascribed by the classical view to identity (is an "*I*--predicable" in Geach's terminology) may cease to have them. To pick out any one stage of the language and say that those expressions that are *I*--predicables at that point must always be, are somehow necessarily, in virtue of their meaning, *I*-predicables is to "freeze" the language---to prohibit it from growing in certain directions.

This argument is confused. Suppose we interpret "*R(__,__)*" as expressing identity, and take *L* to have as its domain word types. We are in no way blocked from adding the predicate "is more legible than" to *L*. It would be a futile gesture unless some names for word tokens were also added, but there is also no objection to doing that. In that case we have not *L*+, but *L*++---*L* plus "*K(__,__)*" plus some names for word tokens. Nothing in *L* prevents us from taking "*R(__,__)*" as expressing identity; in so doing we do not block the development of *L* to *L*++.

What about the claim that interpreting "*R(__,__)*" as expressing identity will "pollute our ontology"? To make this point Geach introduces another example; a look at it will indicate the sorts of confusion that underlie this charge.

> As I remarked years ago when criticizing Quine, there is a certain set of predicables that are true of men but do not discriminate between two men of the same surname. If the ideology of a theory T is restricted to such predicables, the ontology of T calls into being a universe of androids (as science fiction fans say) who differ from men in just this respect, that two different ones cannot share the same surname. I call these androids surmen; a surman is in many ways very much like a man, e.g., he has brains in his skull and a heart in his breast and guts in his belly. The universe now shows itself as a baroque Meinongian structure, which hardly suits Quine's expressed preference for desert landscapes (Geach, 1969a, p. 10).

Here we have a language fragment whose predicates are such that all the same predicates apply to me, my father, my brother and the rest of the Perrys, and the same is true of the Smiths and Joneses, and so forth. If the words in this

language fragment corresponded to English, then there would be nothing to stop us, says Geach, from interpreting "has the same last name" as expressing identity; this would be an *I*--predicable in the rump language. Then, he suggests, the names in the language fragment will have to be reinterpreted as names of surmen, which are queer and objectionable entities.

But as far as I can see, nothing more objectionable than families would emerge from this reinterpretation. I cannot see why Geach thinks it should require androids. The entity that has all the persons with a certain last name as occurrences (parts or members) is clearly something like a family, and not anything like an android. Moreover, this example is not analogous to the theoretical descriptions Geach gives in his abstract arguments; here we go from the richer language to the leaner; it is not clear how the predicates (such as "has guts in his belly") are to be reinterpreted in such a case, and Geach gives us no directions.

It seems to me that any cogency that attaches to Geach's claim of pollution can be traced to a confusion of his position with some sort of nominalism. Geach's position seems to presuppose nominalism: the thesis that, in our terminology, only occurrences are ultimately real. But it amounts to far more. The nominalist would claim that "being of the same type" is analyzable in terms of "equiformity" and that references to types are in some sense eliminable; Geach seems to claim that they are not only eliminable, but never occur in the first place.

The disadvantages of interpreting a predicate like "*R(__,__)*" as identity are thus illusory; are there any advantages?

The most obvious is that if we interpret "*R(__,__)*" as "equiform" even though there are no predicates in *L* that discriminate between tokens, then we seem to be granting that the speakers of *L* refer to a kind of objects, tokens, between which they have no means of distinguishing. But if tokens cannot be individuated in *L*, is it really reasonable to suppose that the users of *L* are actually talking about tokens, but have just not bothered to express in the language any of the ways they use to tell them apart?

This point does not have its full weight with the example of *L*. *L*, a language with a restricted subject matter of the sort dealt with only by those with access to a richer language, presents itself as an artificial language. It clearly might be reasonable for someone to stipulate that the referring expressions in some artificial language he is discussing should be construed as referring to tokens even if they could be construed as referring to types; he might, for example, want to compare *L* with wider languages such as *L*+, and this might be more conveniently done if *L* is so construed.

But suppose an anthropologist should have the following worry. He arrives at a coherent and plausible translation scheme for a certain out-of-the-way language. In this scheme a certain predicate, "*R(__,__)*" is translated "__is identical with__." In the thousands of conversations he has recorded and studied he has found no cases in which natives would deny that an object had the relation expressed by this predicate to itself; he has found that, in every case, once natives find objects have this relation, they are willing to infer that what is true of one is true of the other. In a murder trial, the prosecution tries to prove, and the defense to disprove, that this relation obtains between the defendant and the murderer. But our anthropologist is a Geachian. He worries, Does "*R(__,__)*" really express identity? Do they really talk about people, or only stages of people? This is absurd. Some internally consistent theory about the natives' beliefs and linguistic practices could be formulated that casts this sort of metaphysical doubt on any entry in the anthropologist's dictionary. He need not have any special worries about identity; in the situation described, there is no real room for doubt.

With regard to one's own language, it seems clear that we can pick out predicates--for example, "is one and the same as"---which, in some sense I shall not here try to analyze, owe their logical properties (transitivity, symmetry, and so forth) to their meaning, and could not lose them merely by virtue of additions to the ideology of the language, or changes in the state of the nonlinguistic world. Such predicates express the concept of identity.

Thus, as far as I can see, Geach has no effective arguments against the dilemma posed in Part II for any counterexample to Frege. Until some counterexample is put forward to which those objections do not apply, we have no reason to reject this part of Frege's account of identity. In the next section, I shall examine an example of the required form which may seem more powerful than the one discussed thus far.

5. SAME CLAY, DIFFERENT STATUE

Suppose Smith offered Jones $5,000 for a clay statue of George Washington. Jones delivers a statue of Warren Harding he has since molded from the same clay, and demands payment, saying, "That's the same thing you bought last week."

It is the same piece of clay, but a different statue. It seems then that we can form the awkward but true conjunction.

> This is the same piece of clay as the one you bought last week, but this is a different statue from the one you bought last week.

What are we to say of this sentence (See Wiggins, 1967, pp. 8ff.)?

Following the criticisms of such counterexamples outlined in Section II, we could either say that "this" and "the one you bought last week" refer to pieces of clay in the first conjunct and statues in the second, or that one or the other of the conjuncts does not assert or deny identity.

To maintain the first criticism, we must claim that "this statue" and "this clay" would not in this situation refer to one and the same object; that the clay and the statue are not identical. This view seems paradoxical to some, but I think it can be reasonably defended. There are things true of the one not true of the other (for example, the piece of clay was bought in Egypt in 1956, but not the statue) and the piece of clay may remain with us long after the statue is destroyed. There is clearly a rather intimate relation between the two; I would argue that this relation is that the current "stage" of the piece of clay and the current "stage" of the statue are identical. We might well reserve the phrase "are the same thing" for

this relation, while using "identical," "are the same object," "are the same entity," and so forth, for the notion whose logical properties were formulated by Leibniz and Frege. But the point I wish to insist on at present is simply that there is nothing paradoxical about maintaining that the clay and the statue are not identical, and a great deal that is problematical about maintaining the opposite.

If all the references are to the statue, then "being the same piece of clay" simply amounts to "being made of the same piece of clay" and does not express identity. If all the references are to the clay, then "__ is a different statue from __" should be construed as meaning "--is a different statue than--was" which amounts to "__is formed into a statue that is not identical with the statue__was formed into."

Having these alternative u[7]nobjectionable analyses of the apparent counterexample does not constitute an *embarras des richesse*. The speaker's intention to refer to the clay or the statues, or the clay in one conjunct and the statues in the other, might be revealed by later turns in the conversation. But he need not have any such intentions, just as when I say "This is brown" with a gesture toward my desk, I need not have decided whether I am referring to the desk or its color.

6. CONCLUSION

Let me then summarize my position. (1) In identity statements like "This is the same river as that" the general term plays the same role as it does in "This river is the same as that river;" it identifies the referents, and not the "kind of identity" being asserted. (2) Apparent counterexamples to the equivalence of *"x* and *y* are the same F" and *"x* and *y* are *F*s, and are the same," of the form *"x* is the same *F* as *y* but *x* and *y* are different *G*'s" err either because (i) they have the grammatical, but not the logical, form of a counterexample, since the referring expressions do not have the same referents in both conjuncts, or (ii) one of the conjuncts does not assert or deny identity, but one of the other relations often expressed by phrases

of the form "is the same *F* as." (3) Geach's criticisms of the distinctions implicit in (i) and (ii) are unfounded.[8]

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[1] I base my remarks about what Frege could say and would say on his general view of these matters as expressed in various writings, and not on any specific discussion of this problem. My general view about identity owes much to Frege's remarks in *his Grundlagen der Arithmetic* (1884/1960), sec. 62 ff., and those expressed by W. V. Quine in *From a Logical Point of View* (1963, pp. 65 ff.)

[2] It should be pointed out that Frege would not regard this equivalence as a helpful analysis of "being the same *F*." See the remarks cited in note 2.

[3] This may seem inconsistent with the view I attributed to Frege with respect to the bathing example. The river I bathed in yesterday and the river I bathed in today are water, and they are the same. Shouldn't it follow that they are the same water? Well, in the sense in which the rivers are water, they are the same water, and were the same water yesterday--although the river I bathed in today is not the water the river I bathed in yesterday was. Two confusions need to be avoided. First, the statement in question, that the river I bathed in yesterday and the river I bathed in today are the same water, is not an identity statement (see below). Second, the truth of this statement in no way conflicts with the falsity of "The water I bathed in yesterday and the water I bathed in today are the same," which, on one interpretation, is what "What I bathed in yesterday and what I bathed in today are the same water" amounts to in the example in question.

[4] It is important to see that statements of ″relative" identity are not what I have called ″identity statements" at all, but rather what I would prefer to call ″statements of resemblance" or ″common property statements." The statement on p. XX above, for example, are what Geach calls statements of relative identity. Relative identity should not be confused with restricted identity (see p. XX, above). On my view, a restricted identity statement can be reworded without changing referents, as a clear identity statement: to say ″Leningrad and Stalingrad are the same city" is just to say ″The city of Leningrad is identical with the city of Stalingrad." This is not true of statements of relative identity--and that is why they are not identity statements.

[5] Double quotes occasionally function as quasi-quotes. I am ignoring problems of nonextensional contexts.

[6] In the original, I misquoted Geach as having said "pollute".

[7]

[8] I am grateful to a number of persons for commenting on earlier versions of this paper; I would particularly like to thank Keith Donnellan and Wilfrid Hodges.